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


FOCUS

MIDWEST

A MAGAZINE SENSITIVE TO THE REALITIES IN OUR SOCIETY

Hanging in There:

Grassroots Organizing in the '70's



- ISSUES AND COMMUNITIES: THE CAP MODEL OF ORGANIZING
- BUILDING A BLACK COMMUNITY: POPULAR ECONOMICS IN LAWDALE
- WHAT HAPPENED AT HOTPOINT: THE ELECTION AT LOCAL 571
- A CHALLENGE TO LABOR: SADLOWSKI AND THE STEEL WORKERS
- TWO WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS: WOMEN EMPLOYED AND THE CHICAGO WOMEN'S LIBERATION UNION
- WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE COUNTERCULTURE?

OUT OF FOCUS

(Readers are invited to submit items for publication, indicating whether the sender can be identified. Items must be fully documented and not require any comment.)

St. Louis County is notorious for the number of its municipalities, a staggering 92 in all. When a routine inquiry was mailed to the "city halls" of all municipalities, eleven were returned as undeliverable or cannot be located. The eleven are: Berdell Hills, Bellerive, Country Life Acres, Champ, Country Club Hills, Glen Echo Park, Huntleigh, Mackenzie, Sycamore Hills, Schuermann Heights, and Wilbur Park.

As measured by the consumer price index, June to September price advances in Kansas City (1.9 percent) and St. Louis (1.4 percent) closely followed the advance in the national city average (1.9 percent). The sharpest annual increase from September 1974 for a group was for housing with prices advancing between 10 and 12 percent in the Kansas City and St. Louis areas. The September 1975 national city average all item index (1967=100) was 163.6 while Kansas City was 160.2 and St. Louis was 158.9.

Missouri Economic Indicators, University of Missouri-Columbia

Phil Smith, chairman of the black Illinois Political Caucus, was quoted in the *Chicago Tribune* on the slating of black State Sen. Cecil A. Partee as Democratic challenger to William J. Scott, popular Republican attorney general. "Cecil needs voodoo to beat Bill Scott, and then he might lose. It's a sham to make a big show by calling Partee the first black to be slated statewide by the Democrats. He is really the first black state leader to be hung."

Tom Hayden, primary challenger to Sen. John V. Tunney (D. Calif.), told the *Los Angeles Times* of the frustrations of his campaign: "In the days when I was demonstrating in the streets and wasn't wearing a coat and tie, people said, 'You should put on a coat and tie and work within the system' . . . So I put on a coat and tie and am trying to work within the system, and the same people now are saying, 'You are too radical.'"

The gasoline pump automatically cuts off the flow of fuel into the car's tank. But the attendant invariably returns to "top off" the tank, putting in enough extra gas to bring the level to the very edge and usually spilling a little. Maybe he just wants to register a round dollar figure on the pump's meter. The amount varies, but gasoline is wasted. This careless habit results in our 107 million cars spilling at least 10 million gallons - and possibly 40 million - of gasoline a year. Although few surveys have been made on this topic, *Energy Reporter* estimates we could run as many as 55,000 cars at a year's average driving with the fuel now being spilled at service stations.

The enormous rate at which mankind is consuming energy threatens to turn the world into a hothouse that will melt polar ice sheets and push the oceans into the hearts of major cities and some of the globe's best farmland. "This terminal catastrophe to man's present attitude toward life stands 80 to 180 years in the future - no more." The view of some uninformed, doomsaying kook? Hardly. It is the statement of marine scientist Howard A. Wilcox, director of the United States Navy's Ocean Farm Project.

"Out of deference to members of the House" who opposed an \$8.8-million procurement request by the administration for production of lethal nerve gas weapons, the committee denied the line item, but then added an equivalent sum to the Pentagon's operation and maintenance account for purchasing chemical protective clothing outfits.

Congressional Quarterly Inc.

The United States Outstanding Physical Fitness Leadership Award, sponsored by the President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports, has been awarded this year to former President Richard M. Nixon. It was presented by Edward W. Bradley, the 1963 recipient, who declaimed that "despite the problems that beset his time in office . . . Nixon was always and still remains a warm ally and friend to those of us who are in the athletic arena." The award, a three-foot statue, bears a plaque entitled "Hand in Hand Toward Unity."



FOCUS

MIDWEST

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IN THIS ISSUE

"Seeds were planted and they are now growing in a somewhat different soil," writes Harold Baron in his introduction to this special issue on "Grassroots Organizing." The somewhat euphoric hope of the sixties has been replaced by the pragmatism of the seventies. Yet, as Baron points out, "the present organizing efforts have been partially constructed from issues posed, leaders trained and consciousness raised by the movements of the sixties."

Baron, who was our guest editor for this issue, is on the staff of the Associated Colleges of the Midwest's Urban Studies Program in Chicago. During the 1960s he was research director of the Chicago Urban League and he has published numerous studies on racism in America. One of these, "Building Babylon" was published in FOCUS/Midwest (Vol. 8, No. 56).

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Missouri must do more for its employees

Employees of the Missouri Division of Family Services have recently formed an association to represent their interests. It is a commonplace that state employees are underpaid. But are funds available to increase wages significantly?

Missouri is a relatively wealthy state but spends less per capita on practically all social service enterprises than most other states. Salaries paid to its employees are among the lowest in the nation. Indeed, some Missouri employee pay scales rank below the relative standing of ADC (Aid for Dependent Children) payments. Wages in the Family Service Divisions of Illinois and Kansas, for example, are much higher than those paid for equivalent positions in Missouri. (Illinois ranks third among states in its pay scale; Kansas, 16th; Missouri, 40th.) Furthermore, employees in the Missouri Division have been getting raises barely equivalent to cost-of-living increases. These shortcomings in providing adequate salaries, of course, reflect the low taxes which Missourians pay.

Yet there has been an upgrading of salaries since reorganization of the state administration. The newly appointed department heads receive salaries much higher than ever paid previously. Authorization for some of these salaries is provided by law. Similarly, since reorganization many new people have been appointed assistant directors at very adequate salaries. These new administrators are provided for by statute and are not required to qualify under the state's merit system. It is not that we begrudge the directors' salaries. However, if the need of upgrading salaries is recognized for the division heads, why should the division's employees still be paid as little as they were paid in the mid-sixties?

It appears that it is not so much the state administrator nor the Governor who is at fault — although they could make a better issue of it — as it is the shortsightedness of the legislature. Members of both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees display little interest in providing for adequate salaries. Indeed, we are told, as far as many of the leadership of the Missouri General Assembly are concerned, the qualifications for caseworker and other professional positions might well be lowered and salaries paid commensurate with the lower requirements. Apparently, they feel, their untrained wives, girl friends, and school-age children could do just as well at providing social services as the professionally qualified practitioners.

Sadly, there are probably less than a dozen legislators in Jefferson City who have a good understanding of the appropriations-personal services requirements, and of these only a few have a concern about welfare and its proper administration. This hurts especially while we flounder through a recession with increased caseloads, an increased cost of living, and inadequate appropriations for employees.

We cannot visualize any short-term solutions. In the long run, upgrading will only come once the employees have created a powerful lobby, enlisted the support of sympathetic organizations, and direct their requests at those legislators instrumental in the allocation of funds. Ultimately, they all must face the ballot box.

Access to broadcast media is a public right

In an open society, access to television is a right. Numerous regulations appear to assure that right. But when money, air waves, and broadcast licenses are limited, the extension of broadcast privileges to some inevitably diminishes those privileges for others. Access to the broadcast media, therefore, is grudgingly given and, in the absence of public pressure, easily withdrawn.

In 1974, members of Chicago's Alliance to End Repression helped to form the Citizens Committee on the Media (CCOM) to facilitate access by a broad spectrum of community leaders to the broadcast media and, actually, thereby to aid stations in fulfilling their requirements for the Ascertainment and Fairness Doctrines, which they must observe to have their license renewed.

The Fairness Doctrine requires broadcasters to provide alternative viewpoints when airing a controversial issue of public importance. "Ascertainment" requires broadcasters to seek out the views of community leaders as to the problems of the community. In order to fulfill both these requirements, stations usually compile lists of community leaders and experts in various fields.

CCOM proceeded by surveying radio and TV stations: first, visiting in person to examine the files; subsequently interviewing by phone the station manager, program director, or public affairs director, all of whom could speak with authority on the station's policy. The results were compiled in weekly hour-by-hour schedules of public affairs programming.


CCOM compiled its list of spokespeople by inviting over 300 organizations to a conference on "Public Access (& How to Get It)". The 73 organizations that responded got copies of the station surveys, advice on using it, and a questionnaire eliciting names of community leaders, the subjects on which they were prepared to speak and their experience or expertise in these subjects.

On the basis of completed questionnaires, CCOM compiled its "Collective Request." CCOM then sent the Collective Request to the executive at each station who had been interviewed for this purpose, and visited the 17 largest stations to promote its use.

The entire process, from initial examination of stations' files to follow-up visits with the Collective Request, took about one year. The bulk of the process was accomplished by two students working full-time for six weeks, in return for college credit, plus some part-time volunteer help during the entire year. Because there were no paid staff, expenses were minimal: enough to cover printing and mailing.

Phil Olenick, who described the CCOM in *Access*, Oct. 6, 1975, noted two drawbacks regarding CCOM's success. First, only half of the largest radio stations and none of the TV stations used the Collective Request, because, they said, they already had their own lists. Secondly, momentum fades with time. To counter the latter difficulty, Ron Grossman, a principle staff member, suggested that the Request be updated every two months. According to volunteer staff member Mary Alice Rankin, the stations' attitudes toward the Request have not changed appreciably, but the response from community organizations has expanded.

continued on page 46



THE CITIES

THE SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE CHICAGO CITY COUNCIL

Trying to find out what Chicago city government is up to from **Mayor Daley's** footsoldiers at City Hall is not unlike trying to delve into the inner recesses of the Pentagon. Perhaps harder, because City Hall rarely leaks. **Andrea Rozran** and other members of the **League of Women Voters** in Chicago occasionally try to obtain copies of legislation pending in City Council for the purpose of testifying on it. (See box for a description of one such attempt.) They have met dead ends at the Municipal Reference Library, the Legislative Reference Bureau (the research division of the City Council), the City Clerk's Office and the committees to which legislation has been sent.

It is nearly impossible for anyone (even sometimes aldermen) to obtain copies of legislation before passage by the Council. The **City Clerk** has possession of ordinances immediately after introduction and sends them to the printer of the official journal. Are they then *printed* in this official journal? No, not until they have been passed and are law. Each proposed ordinance (neither titled nor numbered) gets a one- to two-line "summary" in the journal when introduced; these summaries range from barely descriptive to downright deceptive. One resolution calling on the Mayor to respond to charges that he used his office to benefit members of his family financially was reported in the journal: "Also, a proposed resolution asking for accountability by a city official." Would you guess that it concerned Mayor Daley and one son's city insurance contracts and another son's constant appointments to court receiverships?

The City Council's Record Clerk, **C. R. Berek**, has been known to say that if ordinances *were* available, they would cost \$1 a page, but besides, they're not public information. Such proposed ordinances are subject to amendment and could be misinterpreted by the public.

So much for public input into Chicago's legislative process. Citizens and citizen groups apparently have no inherent right to copies of legislation; the Legislative Reference Bureau actually says that ordinances are the property of City Council Committees, *not* the public.

It's a perfect example of catch-22. Civic groups and organizations may be interested

in proposed legislation of any kind, from city code regulation of towing companies, to housing programs, to the Chicago City Budget. But, until the legislation has been passed, they can't get copies of it or information on it. After it's been passed and they can't do anything about it, they can have their copies.

Problems in obtaining information on Chicago city government go beyond Chicago's exclusionary legislative process. In January of this year, WBBM-TV put in a call to the **Chicago Board of Election Commissioners** (without identifying themselves) and requested a pamphlet containing the 1976 election calendar. They were told that they would have to pick it up and then were hung up on. Their angry editorial heightened public awareness momentarily, but didn't guarantee a different response to a future similar request.

Keeping information on public business secret from, or unavailable to, the public

takes many forms. Sometimes records are not compiled or kept in coherent fashion by the city, rendering tons of raw data unusable. For example, the city budget does not contain an account of the \$250 million in state and federal funds spent by the city. Only by tracking down every single grant submitted through the finance committee at different dates could a total of such funds be compiled. Exact budgets showing how the money is spent would still not be available. The comptroller's report comes out nearly two years after the money is spent and is the only reliable document on these funds.

Or the city may make sources of information such as vouchers and payroll records available only to aldermen and press and actually require that information be laboriously hand-copied, not photographed, xeroxed or microfilmed. When payroll records are made available, they don't contain references to sex or race, so

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collecting data on discrimination is well-nigh impossible.

Although the city has computerized a great deal of data, no one outside the City Administration knows what is stored in the computers — not even aldermen. Yet police data, personnel data, comprehensive data on buildings, air pollution readings and a variety of other material is stored there without checks, without control, without public knowledge. Alderman **Richard Simpson** (44th) once worked with computer experts and discovered a series of errors in the program which gives air pollution data to the city and the news media. These errors meant that the city had been using false data for years and we still don't know whether or not the errors were corrected.

Chicago provides an extreme example of the need, at all government levels, for legislation guaranteeing the public's right to know. Federal legislation covering the availability of federal documents and records has been passed. Public hearings have been held on Illinois House Bill 1820 but it is still pending in committee. The Chicago City Council first buried a proposed Public Access to City Records Ordinance in its **Rules Committee**, the traditional Council burial ground for controversial legislation, when it was introduced December 4, 1974.

This ordinance would cause all city agencies to provide a register of information and provide to members of the public — as well as to aldermen and to the press — access to, or copies at reasonable cost of, all public records not specifically exempted by the ordinance. On May 8, 1975, the City Council allowed the ordinance to be discharged from committee (having never received a hearing) to defeat it by a vote of 40-5. The support of numerous good government groups, radio and T.V. stations and newspapers was not enough to overcome the city's obsessive need to exclude the public as much as possible from its affairs.

That city legislation is dead and cannot be successfully resurrected until it has a broad, organized base of citizen support. Only this citizen threat to administration power would convince them to relinquish the cloak of secrecy which serves to protect that power today. — *Judy Stevens*

Judy Stevens is Legislative Aide to Chicago Alderman Dick Simpson (44th). ■ ■

NEIGHBORHOODS ORGANIZE FOR COMMUNITY SERVICES IN INDEPENDENCE

Citizens of Independence, Missouri, have a grass roots community education project well under way: 39 neighborhood councils with direct communication links to city government departments. It all got

started in 1971 when then Mayor Phil Weeks challenged a Citizens Goal Committee to involve more people in city processes after a 1970 sales tax proposal which city officials felt was essential to future growth had been defeated by a five-to-one margin.

Weeks has since become chairman of the board of the Independence Plan for Neighborhood Councils, Inc. (600 West Mechanic, Independence 64050), a non-political, nonprofit group that utilizes "that old-fashioned nutty neighborliness

that works." (And, a sales tax twice as high as the 1970 proposal passed comfortably in a city election — attributed to increasing understanding achieved through neighborhood councils.)

How do the councils work? Each of the neighborhoods selects up to 40 members at a special election staffed by local League of Women Voters volunteers. Councils meet monthly to discuss problems, projects and possibilities. Each member has a specific position corresponding to a city department — sewer, police, water, planning,

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etc. Council members and city officials meet bimonthly.

Independence Mayor Richard King says the councils are "very effective in dealing with the little things which irritate, things not easy to keep under control without a good deal of citizen input." He specified police problems, chuckholes in roads, and health problems. Sometimes the mayor and city council use the neighborhood councils as "sounding boards" for new ideas, but opponents of any plans presented by city officials are given "equal time." There still are residents, though, who are not aware of the councils — 44.5 percent in a recent survey of 15 neighborhoods.

The citizens recently brought community education to the schools. After the neighborhood councils office issued a catalogue listing the adult education offerings in each school their class enrollment tripled.

The neighborhood council group has spawned some subsidiary organizations:

Independence Plan for Comprehensive Health Services has conducted surveys and published the community's first health services directory. That program has received a \$240,000, four-year grant from the National Institute of Dental Research.

Independence Plan for Continuing Education and Recreation is a listing of all learning resources available through adult education, parks and recreation, and community services. It also lists names and telephone numbers for city officials and neighborhood council presidents.

Independence Plan for Juvenile Concern, financed through a \$35,000 Law Enforcement Assistance Council grant, provides trained, volunteer juvenile probation officers for first offenders; emergency foster homes in the community for run-aways and others who cannot live at home; and a "big buddy" program that matches "problem" elementary students with high school student leaders.

All major projects proposed by neighborhood councils are reviewed by the Citizens Advisory Council (CAC), composed of presidents from each of the neighborhood councils, which functions as the top administrative body of the Independence Plan for Neighborhood Councils, Inc.

The councils run primarily on volunteer energy. But for two years the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation has provided limited administrative support through the Center for Community Education at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. This assistance (\$53,180 for 1975-1976 will provide for expanded staff) is scheduled to be phased out over the next two years. Local United Way officials reportedly have indicated an interest. ■ ■

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ST. LOUIS COUNTY LOSES ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR LOW-COST HOUSING

As the November 1975 newsletter **County Open Housing** points out, the St. Louis suburb of **Creve Coeur** has been the location of three attempts to use planning, zoning and/or power of eminent domain to increase the exclusive character of its neighborhoods. One attempt — a successful one — occurred about 20 years ago, when the City of Creve Coeur converted a new subdivision home into a public building, and the grounds behind it into a public park, by condemning the home after it was purchased by a Black family in spite of its location far from a through-street. Another attempt involved the right of a Jewish congregation to building a temple on Ladue Road. This exclusionary attempt failed when the congregation won its suit in court in 1956.

The latest attempt has been going on for a number of years. It involves **Malcolm Terrace**, a subdivision of 22 modest homes sprinkled over 51 acres on 2500 sq. ft. lots that were platted by St. Louis County in 1895. Over the years various proposals have been made to convert the area to park land. Meanwhile, streets were not improved, and storm water drainage problems remained.

In 1959, the City adopted a Comprehensive Planning and Zoning Ordinance, which put Malcolm Terrace into the highest residential category, A District, requiring one-acre lots and 1600-square-foot houses. A "grandfather" clause within the ordinance alleviated the handicap of "non-conforming use" on homes built prior to April 13, 1959. Thus, if a house in Malcolm Terrace burned down after this date, it could be rebuilt on its present lot without conforming to the new lot-size or house-size requirements of District A. However, because of an unofficial moratorium on building permits in Malcolm Terrace, residents there found themselves unable even to make improvements on their existing homes, so that if and when the City decided to convert the subdivision into a park, houses could be condemned for less money. In preparation for such an eventuality, the City had been quietly buying up 2500-square-foot lots over a number of years; it now owns 172 lots and has contracted to buy 55 more (at \$6,400 per acre, in an area which sells for over \$20,000 per acre).

Controversy about Malcolm Terrace came to a head one and a half years ago, when its residents asked to know the City's intentions. They felt that their property rights were being infringed upon by the inability to get building permits and by the uncertainty over future land use in Malcolm Terrace. In fact, a grandfather clause in the 1959 ordinance gives property owners in Malcolm Terrace the right to build single-family residences on each of the remaining 460 lots at 16 homes per acre. This intense land use in the middle of one of the most

exclusive residential areas of St. Louis County represents a potential profitability of millions of dollars.

In January 1975, the City contracted with Team Four, a private company, to prepare a plan for Malcolm Terrace with the cooperation of its residents. One problem which emerged was the diversity of opinions among Malcolm Terrace residents. For example, a large landowner might have an interest in selling his land as buildable lots for homes. Others, who for sentimental or practical reasons prefer to remain, have an interest in upgrading their homes and their immediate neighborhood and, perhaps, in keeping the rest of the land undeveloped, either as it is or as a "passive" public park. Residents shifted their positions as issues were brought into focus. Team Four prepared several plans over a year's time, all of which were calculated to both (1) upgrade the immediate neighborhood, and (2) use undeveloped land as a public park. In spite of conflicts, residents occasionally united around issues such as avoiding the isolation of one elderly long-term resident by allowing the construction of several houses between hers and the access road.


The final plan proposed that the zoning category be changed to C District, permitting 15,000 square-foot lots. A community unit plan would be applied, however, allowing 18 new homes to build on 10,000-square-foot lots. The City would attempt to get matching federal funds to bring streets and possible storm water sewers up to standard. The residents would give up the potential profitability of developing the land at a high density.

In spite of threats from both sides — last-minute petitions and lawsuits — the City administration and Malcolm Terrace residents worked for the most part in a conciliatory mood. The results seem to have benefitted at least two sides. The City will get a new park and will eliminate a political sore spot. Malcolm Terrace residents were promised street and water improvements and, most importantly, were assured of their right to retain and improve their present-sized homes on their present-sized lots in perpetuity.

Those who have lost, again, are residents of the St. Louis area whose interest is in **retaining low-cost housing opportunities** especially in the rather exclusive central corridor of the county. — *Ginger Harris* ■ ■

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MISSOURI POLITICS

Sen. Stuart Symington's retirement is resulting in a bruising primary for the nomination to succeed him, with no certainty that the survivor could defeat state Attorney General John C. Danforth, the leading GOP candidate. Rep. James W. Symington, son of the senator, is the early leader. His family name is well-known across the state, and has been an asset in raising funds and building an organization. But there is some criticism that the younger Symington may be trying to take advantage of his father's reputation and some old-line politicians say that the urbane, Yale-educated representative has little of the midwestern folksiness normally associated with successful Missouri Democrats. Symington might be hurt further among the conservative wing of the party by his support for the decriminalization of the use of some drugs and his conflicts with the right-to-life movement over the past several years.

Symington is expected to receive his most serious challenge from Rep. Jerry Litton of Chillicothe, a relative newcomer whose political experience is limited to two terms in the House. House members as such consider Symington a more creative and resourceful member. Litton has a reputation as an outstanding campaigner — a good speaker willing to put in long hours. His success was evident in his 1974 re-election campaign, which he won with a whopping 78.9 percent of the vote.

Part of Litton's success is due to his innovative use of television. He hosts a program, "Dialogue with Litton," that attracts leading Democrats from across the country. The program is aired on several stations in the western part of the state, and has served to broaden his name recognition beyond his rural district in northwestern Missouri.

But Litton is little known in the St. Louis area, where approximately one-third of the population resides. The Supreme Court ruling lifting campaign spending ceilings should prove a boon to the wealthy Litton, who made his money in cattle breeding. He has now begun to telecast his "Dialogue" program in the St. Louis area.

The third prominent contender for the nomination is former Gov. Warren E. Hearnes of St. Louis, who has been a declared candidate for nearly a year. Polls taken last fall showed that Hearnes was the best known of the candidates. But he finished third in a trial race behind both Symington and Litton and has the highest negative rating of any of the contenders.

Hearnes has been plagued for the past three years by a Kansas City federal grand

jury investigation of his administration, which is currently scrutinizing his income tax returns. No indictments have been presented, but the investigation is expected to continue at least until April.

Hearnes has always been considered a shrewd campaigner. In his 1964 and 1968 races for governor he proved to be one of the state's most potent vote-getters since World War II, winning over 60 percent of the vote in both contests. His base of support is among old-line Democratic politicians, particularly in the St. Louis area.

Some observers feel that if the grand jury does not make any indictments, Hearnes could successfully portray himself as a martyr. But the damage to his candidacy has already been done.

Two candidates from Kansas City, F. Russell Millin, a lawyer and former U.S. attorney for western Missouri, and Kansas City Mayor Charles B. Wheeler Jr., are given little chance of victory, but could drain votes from Litton. Litton is banking on a strong showing in the Kansas City area to offset poorer showings in other parts of the state where he is less well known.

Millin is a liberal, a lawyer and former head of the local chapters of Common Cause and the New Democratic Coalition. He ran for Attorney General in 1968, losing the primary by a better than two-to-one margin.

The other Kansas City candidate, Mayor Wheeler, is an eccentric politician. In an effort to enliven city government, he has wrestled a bear, ridden an elephant, and collected a large assortment of hats, which he displays in his office. In 1975, he was briefly a candidate for the Democratic vice presidential nomination, quitting the race in December after he was informed that he had to comply with the new federal campaign law. Although Wheeler's candidacy is not regarded seriously by many observers, he has shown voter appeal in the Kansas City area, losing only one of six elections in Jackson County.

The winner of the Democratic primary will oppose Danforth, who faces minimal opposition in the Republican primary. Danforth has established himself as one of Missouri's top vote-getters. When he won the post in 1968, he was the Republican's first successful statewide candidate in 22 years. His margin of re-election in 1972 was over 450,000 votes, the largest ever recorded by a statewide GOP candidate. When it comes to federal spending he is a conservative, decrying the size and waste of federal programs. He has molded a more progressive image on the issues of consumer protection, the environment and antitrust action.


This is Danforth's second try for the Senate. On his first in 1970, he received 48.1 percent of the vote against Sen. Symington.

Once again, a move to place nearly 1,700 revenue employees out of the patronage system and place them under the merit system may fail. This time a twist was added by a key vote cast by the "new politics" senator from Kansas City, Harry Wiggins. In a last-minute vote switch in the Senate Reorganization Committee's 4-to-3 decision to refer Gov. Bond's order to the Senate floor, Wiggins changed sides after a brief chat with Sen. William Cason (D., Clinton). Wiggins asserts that he believes in the merit system but that such an important decision should be decided by the full Senate. He said he would vote for the order on the floor.


State Treasurer James I. Spainhower protested in October 1975 that he doesn't want to turn bankers into "second-class citizens" and will continue to accept their contributions in his 1976 bid for re-election. True to his word, at least 26 bankers from 19 banks attended the \$250 chicken dinner in February. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch reports that Spainhower's aids expected to collect about \$12,000 from the 400 persons who attended. While a full list of the guests was not available, an advance list of 150 already included the 26 bankers. Spainhower rejected any suggestions of a conflict of interest. "These dinners give me grassroots support," he said.

Missouri officials are desperately trying to find a prison site if not outside Missouri at least so inaccessible that it couldn't contaminate the surrounding countryside. They thought they found it. The 500-inmate prison site was to be located in Buchanan County and would have been separated from St. Joseph by the Missouri River. The other three sides are bounded by — Kansas. But Kansas officials wondered out loud how Missouri police and other officials could travel through Kansas in the enforcement of state business. Unless Missouri plans to helicopter its prisoners back and forth, its back to the drawing boards.

Gov. Christopher S. (Kit) Bond (R., Mo.) told the *Kansas City Star* on the problems of governing: "There are times when I can't even get the heat turned on in this office. There's no substitute for being in what is supposed to be an all-powerful position as governor and finding out you really don't have much power."



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ILLINOIS POLITICS

A Congressional Quarterly study

A Delegate Feast For Carter

Illinois Republicans voted pretty much according to expectation in the state's presidential primary March 16, but Democrats provided a surprise, giving former Gov. Jimmy Carter of Georgia a near-majority of the preference vote and electing delegates pledged to him in most of the districts he chose to contest.

Carter's 48 per cent preference showing meant another defeat for Alabama Gov. George C. Wallace, loser to Carter

The Delegate Count

The delegate count is based on nearly complete but unofficial returns from the Illinois primary March 16, the only delegate selection last week. As of March 18, 401 delegates to the Democratic convention had been selected, 271 to the Republican. Following are the nationwide Democratic and Republican delegate counts as of March 18:

	Number of Delegates Selected	Per Cent of Delegates Selected
DEMOCRATS		
Jimmy Carter	123	30.7%
Adlai E. Stevenson III	85	21.2
George C. Wallace	61	15.2
Henry M. Jackson	55	13.7
Morris K. Udall	23	5.7
Sargent Shriver	11	2.7
Fred R. Harris	6	1.5
Hubert H. Humphrey	6	1.5
Daniel Walker	4	1.0
Birch Bayh	1	0.2
Ellen McCormack	1	0.2
Milton J. Shapp	1	0.2
Uncommitted	24	6.0
Convention vote total	3,008	
Needed to nominate	1,505	
REPUBLICANS		
Gerald R. Ford	167	61.6%
Ronald Reagan	53	19.6
Uncommitted	51	18.8
Convention vote total	2,259	
Needed to nominate	1,130	

in Florida the week before. The returns were also disappointing for Sargent Shriver, whose 16 per cent—he had hoped for a higher percentage—brought him in third. He suspended his active campaign when he got the news. Former Okla. Sen. Fred R. Harris, fourth with 8 per cent, moved on to campaign in Pennsylvania.

In the Republican preference vote, Ford defeated Ronald Reagan for the fifth time in five primaries, and the third time in states where both campaigned. Reagan resisted suggestions from Ford allies that he give up, saying he was making progress and would remain a candidate no matter what happened in the North Carolina primary March 23.

Nearly complete preference returns:

Democrats

Jimmy Carter	621,988	48.4%
George C. Wallace	356,676	27.8
Sargent Shriver	207,916	16.2
Fred R. Harris	97,183	7.6

Republicans

Gerald R. Ford	450,812	58.9
Ronald Reagan	307,305	40.1
Lar Daly	7,544	1.0

Ford did even better in the separate delegate selection primary than he did on the preference ballot. With the tallies in delegate races nearing completion March 19, Ford appeared to have won 71 of the 96 delegates at stake in the 24 congressional districts. Reagan was the apparent winner in 12, and 13 were going uncommitted. Exact figures are likely to change when the official canvass takes place later in the month.

Carter's showing in the Democratic delegate selection primary was impressive. He filed candidates pledged to him for only 93 of the state's 155 delegate slots, and was the apparent winner for 53.

Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson III, in whose name the regular party organization filed delegate candidates in most of the state, won 85. But in most areas where Carter and Stevenson competed, Carter won.

Six delegates were elected pledged to Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (Minn.), four pledged to Gov. Daniel Walker and three pledged to Wallace. A total of 18 uncommitted delegates were elected.

When the official results are in, Illinois Democratic leaders will select 14 at-large delegates, whose preferences will be in proportion to the delegates selected March 16.

A detailed look at the results of the delegate contest shows a clean split between the Chicago districts and those in the rest of the state. Carter did not contest most of the Chicago districts, in which Daley's regular party organization is strong, and Stevenson had little trouble winning the delegate contests. Stevenson did not lose a single delegate election in the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 11th Districts. All are Chicago constituencies where the party organization dominates Democratic politics, and most are represented in Congress by Democrats loyal to Daley. Stevenson also swept the 3rd District, a working-class area that lies mostly outside the city, but elected a Democratic representative with organization help in 1974.

The only other suburban district friendly to Stevenson was the 10th, an area of prosperous suburbs north of the city where the organization is not particularly strong, but where Stevenson's personal popularity has always been high. Even here, it was not a clean sweep—Stevenson won six delegates, Carter, one.

Carter won all the delegates elected in both the 12th and 13th Districts, areas that are heavily Republican in makeup, but in which the Democratic minority tends to be independent and liberal. In the 14th, another heavily Republican suburban area, Carter took four out of five delegates. Stevenson won the other. Carter's performance in several of these delegate elections was especially impressive because the candidates on his slate were not particularly well-known or well-connected in their areas. Voters simply chose the name on the ballot listed as being pledged to Carter.

Outside the metropolitan Chicago area, the outcome went equally well for Carter. In the 15th, a largely rural and small-town district that touches the far Chicago suburbs in Kane County, Carter won five of six delegates selected. The sixth went to a candidate pledged to Humphrey. In the 16th, which includes the city of Rockford, Carter took four, with one going for Humphrey and a sixth being uncommitted. In the 17th, along the Indiana border, unofficial returns also appeared to give Carter four delegates.

Returns from central and southern Illinois were incomplete, even late in the week, but Carter appeared to have won all the delegates selected in the 18th District, surrounding Peoria, and in the 21st, which includes the University of Illinois community in Champaign-Urbana.

It was only in the 23rd and 24th Districts, in the far southern portion of the state, that Carter had difficulty. In the 23rd, all six delegate positions went to an uncommitted slate headed by Alan J. Dixon, the state treasurer and party nominee for secretary of state. In the 24th, where seven delegates were chosen, at least five of the seven are expected to go to another uncommitted slate led by U.S. Rep. Paul Simon. Simon is the national leader in a draft-Humphrey movement; both the Simon and Dixon slates are thought to be solid for Humphrey.

Republicans

The Republican delegate selection picture was marked by consistent success for the Ford slates. The President's forces won even in the suburban districts where Reagan was said to be strongest.

Metcalf Wins Easily:

Walker Beaten for Renomination in Illinois

While the presidential primary was attracting most of the attention and absorbing the national media March 16, Illinois Democrats were turning their governor out of office in a vote that climaxed one of the angriest primary campaigns any state has held in recent years.

When it was over, Michael J. Howlett was the Democratic nominee, Daniel Walker had become a lame-duck incumbent, and the regular party organization led by Mayor Richard Daley had regained its hold on the state Democratic structure.

Howlett, the 61-year-old secretary of state, agreed to challenge Walker late in 1975 after allies of the mayor had urged him all year to run. It was not a campaign based on issues; the two men did differ on numerous aspects of public policy, but the primary was a fight for control of the Illinois Democratic Party in the coming years. Howlett and Daley won it easily, surviving newspaper reports during the campaign that played up consulting fees Howlett received from a Chicago steel company while holding state office.

Heated Campaign

It was not a pleasant campaign. Walker accused

Within Chicago, Reagan won only one delegate, in the 8th District. In the 6th, where most of the prominent Ford supporters chose to run uncommitted, their uncommitted slate took three of the four places.

The Reagan showing was most disappointing in the "collar counties" of Du Page, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will, conservative areas where Reagan was supposed to have a chance to carry the preference vote and elect a majority of the delegates. Reagan did not elect a single one of his delegates in any of the districts within these counties. U.S. Rep. Philip Crane, a leader in the statewide Reagan campaign, lost his own bid to become a delegate pledged to Reagan in the 12th District, which he represents.

Reagan did somewhat better downstate. He appeared to have won three or four delegates in the 17th, largely because Ford supporters were running uncommitted rather than pledged to Ford. The former California governor also won two of the four delegate spots in the 19th District, with the candidacy of U.S. Rep. Thomas F. Railsback as a Ford delegate helping to improve the President's showing there. In the four southernmost districts, the 20th, 22nd, 23rd and 24th, Ford won every delegate contested.

In the preference vote, Reagan failed to carry any Republican population center. He drew only 32.6 per cent of the vote in Chicago, and only 35.8 per cent in Cook County as a whole. In the collar county of Du Page, where he was expected to run well, Reagan's percentage was only 37.8. In Winnebago County (Rockford), another area of potential Reagan strength, it was 39.2. It was only in some of the smaller Republican areas in rural parts of the state that Reagan's percentage improved, and there were not enough votes in these regions to make the statewide contest close.

In the Democratic preference primary, Carter generally ran better in the suburbs and downstate than he did in Chicago proper. Carter's percentage of 44.5 in the city was several points down from his statewide figure of 48.4. Much of this represented a loss of Chicago votes to Shriver, whose 22.1 per cent Chicago showing was significantly higher than the 16.2 per cent he received overall. The Wallace vote in Chicago and the Cook County suburbs was slightly below his 27.8 per cent statewide total. —By Alan Ehrenhalt ■

Howlett of being a Daley puppet and stooge, and of practicing a "copout" and "coverup" in his handling of the steel company disclosures. Howlett called Walker a "bum," an "irresponsible son of a bitch," and a "dirt-spewing jalopy."

Since his surprise election in 1972, Walker had been a constant source of irritation to the party regulars. He had made no secret of his intention to establish a separate Democratic organization to supplant Daley's. His campaign for renomination this year included a full slate of candidates for lesser statewide office and a slate of candidates for delegate to the Democratic National Convention.

The reason Daley wanted Howlett as the challenger had to do with Howlett's reputation as a vote-getter. A four-time winner for state office, Howlett has been a popular figure in rural downstate Illinois despite his background as an Irish Catholic from Chicago's South Side.

Actually, however, a look at the returns indicates that Howlett won his primary more in the Chicago suburbs than downstate. Outside Cook County (Chicago and suburbs), Walker defeated Howlett by better than 100,000 votes. But in the Cook County suburbs, which Walker carried by 60,000 in his 1972 primary victory, Howlett came out more

than 20,000 votes ahead.

This suburban plurality allowed Howlett to take maximum advantage of the 200,000 vote margin Daley's organization built for him within the city, and to neutralize the Walker lead downstate.

Walker's advantage downstate was limited by the low turnout in areas where he ran well. In 1972, when voters were permitted for the first time to vote in either party's primary, the turnout downstate was twice as high on the Democratic side as on the Republican. Crossover votes from downstate Republicans were instrumental in Walker's narrow nomination.

But this year, with an active contest between Ford and Reagan on the Republican presidential ballot, most Republicans chose to stick with their party primary. Downstate turnout was nearly as high on the Republican side as on the Democratic side, and while Walker managed to carry most of the downstate counties, his pluralities in them were small.

There was no suspense in the Republican primary for governor. James Thompson, recently resigned as U.S. Attorney for Northern Illinois, won the nomination easily over Richard Cooper, millionaire executive of Weight Watchers Inc. Thompson did little campaigning in the Chicago area, instead spending his time meeting downstate voters in preparation for the fall campaign. Many observers believe he enters that campaign a favorite, given the damage Walker did to Howlett in the course of the Democratic primary. But Thompson is a newcomer to politics, and his campaign abilities are undemonstrated. Whoever wins, the reward will be a term of only two years—Illinois is switching its gubernatorial elections to non-presidential years and this will be the transition term.

The Fall of France

The Daley organization was also heavily involved in one House race, in the heavily black 1st District on Chicago's South Side. Billed as a dramatic struggle for the allegiance of Chicago's black community, it turned out to be one of the great mismatches of recent congressional politics.

Rep. Ralph H. Metcalfe, a long-time Daley ally who turned critic over the issue of police brutality, was under challenge from Erwin A. France, former director of the Chicago Model Cities program. France had the full support of the party organization, and many Chicago Democrats predicted the power of the machine would be too much for the 65-year-old incumbent.

But the result left observers wondering what all the fuss had been about. Metcalfe finished with over 53,000 votes, 71 per cent, to the 21,000 tallied by France. It was an unexpectedly easy victory for Metcalfe and for his allies, who claimed that Chicago blacks would never reach their full influence until they broke with Daley.

Republican Results

Outside Chicago, the House primaries were peaceful. The Republican picture cleared in two districts where the GOP lost control to Democrats in 1974. In the suburban 10th, Samuel H. Young won the nomination for another try against Democratic Rep. Abner J. Mikva, who ousted him two years ago. In the 15th, in central Illinois, Republicans chose the veteran party official Tom Corcoran as their candidate against Democratic Rep. Tim Lee Hall. And in the

A Man of Contention

Daniel Walker's three years as governor of Illinois have been marked by quarrels and partisan bickering unusual even in a highly politicized state.

The governor's style has given him intensely loyal friends and intensely angry enemies. Both sides concede that he has practiced a politics of deliberate confrontation—with the



Daniel Walker

organization that normally dominates the party and with the legislature that has considered him a threat to its normal style of operation. Walker's challenge to the Daley organization began early in his 1972 primary campaign, when he tagged then-Lt. Gov. Paul

Simon as the machine candidate when Simon accepted the mayor's support.

Once in office, Walker found his conflicts with Daley reflected in arguments with Democrats in the Illinois legislature, most of them party regulars from the Chicago area. Walker sought to hold state spending down with cuts in social service and education programs; Democrats in the legislature disagreed and sometimes overrode his vetoes. Daley and his allies wanted a crosstown expressway; Walker was adamant against it. Daley wanted the state's congressional districts redrawn to maximize the organization's influence; Walker worked to stop him.

The arguments over politics were the loudest. Walker campaigned in 1972 as a non-politician untarnished by party battles, proclaiming "the people have won" after he had been nominated. As governor, however, Walker proved adept at party maneuvering. He worked hard to build on the downstate base that helped him in 1972, putting friendly county chairmen on his state payroll as a means of developing an organization alternative to the regular one.

Where Walker failed, however, was in his effort to hold the allegiance of reform-minded Democrats who had been attracted by his anti-politics approach of 1972. Walker's problems with the liberal wing of his party began in the early days of his term, after he proclaimed himself a fiscal conservative and a hard-liner on law and order. Walker favored capital punishment and opposed gun control. He offered a crime program based on mandatory minimum sentences without parole. And he was publicly critical of waste in the education and welfare programs the reform Democrats traditionally have supported.

3rd, in the working-class suburbs south of Chicago, South Holland attorney Ronald Buikema will challenge Democratic Rep. Martin A. Russo. —By Alan Ehrenhalt



Nearly complete returns:

GOVERNOR

Candidate	Residence	Age	Occupation	Votes	Per Cent
Michael J. Howlett (D)*	Chicago	61	Secretary of State	792,306	53.9
Daniel Walker (D)	Deerfield	53	Incumbent	678,495	46.1
James R. Thompson (R)*	Chicago	39	Former U.S. Attorney	612,999	86.1
Richard H. Cooper (R)	Winnetka	36	Business executive	98,633	13.9

Complete Illinois House returns continued on page 45

Hanging in There: Grassroots Organizing in the '70s



The political image of the United States in the 1970s -- at least the image projected in the media -- is not one of common people struggling to actualize new visions of a good society. We are constantly reminded that there has been a retreat from the popular upsurge of the sixties, with its demands and hopes, into an era that concentrates on consumption and survival. Today's characteristic attitude is supposed to be one of alienation, personalism and cynicism. There has to be some reality to this picture or it would not be compelling and shape our thinking, but it also has a strong element of ideological overkill. Pervasive portrayal of social and political impotence has the effect of blinding us to the significance of the many imaginative and hard fought campaigns that are presently being waged by groups of common people. We are being conditioned to become voyeurs and look upon these activities with a certain distant curiosity, if indeed we look at them at all. We do not draw inspiration from these activities, but remain encrusted in the desperation bred by our sense of isolation.


With a different mind set we could react differently. We could feel comradeship, we could sense new possibilities, we could draw lessons, and we could act purposively. This special edition has collected six articles on various organizing campaigns in Chicago in order to put forth a different aspect of the realities of the seventies. It is not meant to be parochial, for similar activities are taking place in other cities across the nation including St. Louis and Kansas City, but it is meant to be specific. By examining some concrete cases where common people have organized themselves, we do hope to change some minds.

We have to recognize that the euphoric popular politics of the 1960s is well behind us. At the national level the great debates over civil rights, Black empowerment and the Vietnam War have been displaced by the events of Watergate and the failure of any group to organize a significant political reaction to them. The 1976 Presidential election threatens to be of no greater import than a dull rerun of the 1968 Nixon-Humphrey contest. At the community level, the protest movements of the 1960s have been put down, cooled off, or just worn out. Tragically, no major national organization spawned by these movements has survived as a viable entity.

But seeds were planted and they are now growing in a somewhat different soil. Currently, a wide range of popular movements are developing at the local or the metropolitan level, usually with somewhat different constituencies and programs than those of the previous decade. The sixties movements found their most important constituencies among students and recent ex-students. The seventies popular organizations are based more in working-class and lower middle-class ethnic and racial groupings. Hard day-to-day organizing has come to take precedence over rhetoric.

The potential significance of these organizations is great, for it is clear that American society is facing a major crisis in coming years due to the concurrent effects of a considerable slowdown in economic growth and the waning of its imperial dominance on the world scene. As the present popular organizing efforts have been partially constructed from issues posed, leaders trained and consciousness raised by the movements of the sixties, so we can expect that any popular and progressive responses to the impending crisis will build upon the ground being prepared by the efforts of the seventies.

Issues and Communities:



by Henry Scheff

The scene at the International Ballroom of Chicago's Conrad Hilton Hotel on April 6, 1975, was a bit unusual. Whites, Blacks, Latins — people from virtually all of Chicago's racial and ethnic groups — jammed the room, sitting beneath placards like "Foster Park Community Council," "Cragin Anti-Crosstown Community Association," "Southwest Parish and Neighborhood Federation," and "St. Gen's Senior Citizens."

Twenty-five hundred delegates represented sixty community organizations, civic groups, and senior citizen clubs affiliated with the Citizens Action Program (CAP). The event was CAP's third annual convention, a celebration of past victories and a place to ratify the action program for the coming year. In the same room where Mayor Richard J. Daley draws every important corporate big shot in Chicago to his huge Cook County Democratic Party fundraisers, cheering CAP members, under a huge banner proclaiming "OUR NEIGHBORHOODS FIRST!", announced how they were going to force commercial banks and savings and loan associations to re-invest in Chicago's older neighborhoods. They reaffirmed their determination to continue their successful fight against Mayor Daley's cherished \$2-billion Crosstown Expressway and ratified action proposals on issues such as FHA abuses, drug prices, and utility rates.

The only empty section in the room was beneath a sign which read "Undercover Policemen." Only a month earlier, the *Chicago Daily News* revealed that a member of the CAP steering committee and Congress since the organizations' inception was a full-time Chicago policeman whose only job was to gather political intelligence on CAP for Mayor Daley. The Mayor and his corporate allies were clearly very concerned about an organization that could bring together working- and middle-class people from all over the city, and wage serious and effective fights to stop an expressway and force the corporations to stop "ripping off" Chicago neighborhoods.

The Citizens Action Program was founded in 1969 as the Campaign Against Pollution, with a very small budget and a few neighborhood chapters. In six years it has grown into the largest metropolitan citizens organization in the country, with a paid staff of ten and a budget of \$120,000. Using tactics of mass mobilization, confrontation, and media exposé, and backed by incisive strategic,

tactical and investigative research, CAP has scored numerous and impressive victories for the people and neighborhoods of Chicago. The involvement of hundreds of grassroots organizers has demonstrated that in the seventies the silent majority "Archie Bunker" stereotype does not apply.

The Campaign Against Pollution was formed in late 1969 at the time the ecology movement was catching fire. Initial resources to start the organization came from Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), which was in bad need of developing new middle-class constituencies. The IAF had proven successful in organizing lower income, minority neighborhoods, but by 1969 white IAF organizers were no longer welcome in those neighborhoods. The Campaign Against Pollution was to be their first experiment with "middle class" organizing.


With IAF trainees as the initial field staff, the Campaign Against Pollution was formed to take on the major public utility, Commonwealth Edison. Father Len Dubi, a young working-class, southwest side Catholic priest, and Paul Booth, a former student activist from the early sixties and then trade union staffer, were elected co-chairmen.

Within its first six months, CAP scored some impressive victories. After hundreds of CAP members walked up 19 flights of stairs to testify at an Illinois Commerce Commission hearing (officials had turned off the elevators), ICC ruled that Edison's rate increase would be tied to meeting a pollution control timetable. For the first time in the country, a state utility regulatory agency used pollution control as a factor in a rate increase decision. At Edison's annual stockholders meeting, 1,800 CAP members were in attendance demanding an end to the burning of high-sulphur coal. And a tough anti-pollution ordinance incorporating this demand was passed by the City Council after 500 CAP members demonstrated in front of Mayor Daley's fifth floor City Hall office.

Bolstered by these impressive victories, CAP went on to force the Metropolitan Sanitary District to clean up a filthy waste treatment plant on the southwest side of Chicago and had some success with U.S. Steel on air and water pollution issues.

In the spring of 1971 CAP researchers discovered that the giant U.S. Steel South Works was getting an annual

The CAP Model of Organizing



Henry Scheff is the former Research Director of Citizen's Action Program and is presently on the staff of the Research and Education Department, Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America.

property tax break of \$16.4 million through the handiwork of then Cook County Assessor P.J. Cullerton. Further research uncovered huge and blatant underassessments of three other steel mills, several loop office buildings, five Cook County race tracks, and several suburban shopping centers. Property tax assessments became a major issue with CAP during 1971, and by September of that year the organization changed its name to the Citizens Action Program to reflect its broader interests. The first action of the "new" CAP was dubbed "Pay-off P.J. Day," when, on the final day taxes were due in the fall, 600 people symbolically paid their real estate taxes in specially printed "P.J. Cullerton money."

With the new assessments in 1972 came new CAP victories — the U.S. Steel assessment was more than doubled. Other steel mills were raised an average of 25 per cent. Assessments of the racetracks were hiked substantially. A reform program was instituted in the assessor's office, and objective assessment criteria were instituted for the first time. Howls of protest were heard the following year from the North Michigan Avenue property owners association when their new assessments were published.

CAP becomes multi-issue organization

Now a self-conscious "taxpayers" organization, CAP sponsored a series of its own hearings around the city, and began to emerge as a true multi-issue organization on a metropolitan level made up of existing community organizations and CAP chapters. Out of those hearings came several action campaigns: to stop the Crosstown Expressway, to improve financing of the Public Schools, to prevent more highrise construction on the lakefront, and to gain property tax relief for senior citizens.

During 1972 these campaigns fueled the tremendous growth of CAP. The successful anti-Crosstown campaign formed powerful new CAP-affiliated organizations on the northwest side of Chicago. The Coalition put together some massive actions, including a march and rally of over 3,000 people along the expressway's route. These tactics helped propel Dan Walker to oppose the Crosstown during his gubernatorial campaign that year and to block its

construction once he was in the statehouse. Other CAP victories included tax relief for senior citizens, elimination of some waste in the public school budget, and 24-hour reduced transit fares for seniors.

In a move to consolidate and bring together the new and diverse elements in CAP, Mary Lou Wolff, a northwest side housewife and a leader in the anti-Crosstown fight, was elected president of CAP by the 1400 people in attendance at the 1973 annual convention.

Constituency changes

The election of Ms. Wolff symbolized a transformation in CAP's constituency that had been taking place for a year. The old Campaign Against Pollution, with the notable exception of Father Dubi and people from the Garfield Ridge neighborhood in Chicago (where Dubi's church was located), was mostly an upper middle-class organization, with its greatest strength in such lakefront areas as Hyde Park, Lincoln Park and Rogers Park. CAP members were more "liberal" and intellectual than the average neighborhood resident in most Chicago neighborhoods. CAP members were interested in something called "ecology" and saving the environment for all of the people of the city.

The decision to expand the organization into new issues was a choice by the organizers to expand and change CAP. New issues meant new neighborhoods. Issues like the Crosstown Expressway, property taxes, and schools brought CAP into the ethnic neighborhoods away from Chicago's lakefront. If CAP was ever to be a power in Chicago, it had to go into the areas where the working and middle-class people lived, the people who voted for Richard Nixon and Richard Daley.

This organizing strategy proved to be successful. Dozens of new and talented leaders were trained. They gained experience in a variety of different campaigns. The successful Crosstown fight established CAP's reputation as a winner, with a strong following in ethnic "silent majority" neighborhoods, and propelled Mary Lou Wolff, the mother of nine children, to the presidency of CAP. However, CAP was still a "white" organization, and it took another whole new series of campaigns around issues of

neighborhood deterioration to begin to transform CAP into a bi-racial organization.

In 1973, CAP became involved in its most important issue — redlining. Banks and savings and loan associations were cutting off mortgage, home improvement and business loans to many credit-worthy older Chicago neighborhoods. Along with the fight to end the redlining or cutting off of credit to whole communities, CAP developed an overall strategy to end neighborhood deterioration: better city services; adequate mortgage, home improvement, and business loans; ending block busting and panic peddling; preventing fast foreclosures and other FHA abuses; and ending the downtown favoritism of public works investments, to get better streets, parks and police protection for the less affluent neighborhoods.

CAP leaders came to understand the real forces behind urban decay and redevelopment — the decisions of the private investors and their influence at city hall. These insights brought Blacks and whites together for the first time in Chicago to fight neighborhood deterioration. In the same neighborhoods where Father Lawlor, a Catholic pastor who appealed to racist sentiments of whites, was leading the fight to “keep the Blacks out” in 1970 and 1971, Blacks and whites were beginning to work together to end exploitation by mortgage bankers and financial institutions.

Whites began to take action based on a real understanding of *why* their neighborhoods “changed.” First, the realtors panicked the whites, in an effort to promote rapid, profitable sales with FHA mortgages. Conventional mortgages had already been cut off to the neighborhood by banks and savings and loans for a couple of years, leaving FHA mortgages as the only kind available. This brought down property values, and people selling homes were forced to pay hundreds of dollars in “discount points” to mortgage bankers. Then with local realtors predicting an even gloomier future for the neighborhood, the whites were convinced to flee to the suburbs, where they had to pay inflated prices for inferior housing, far from their jobs. Their churches, ethnic and neighborhood institutions would never be recreated. Slowly, they began to see that “the enemies” were the banks and S&Ls, the mortgage bankers, and the realtors — those who exploited the “changing neighborhood.” Anger was focused at the financial institutions who translated their judgment that a neighborhood might change racially into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Meanwhile, Blacks found that they were getting no bargain when they moved into the “changing neighborhood.” Inflated prices were often paid for homes purchased from speculators. The FHA frequently certified that homes were in good repair when they weren’t. Some of their new Black neighbors were really too poor to own homes, even under FHA guidelines, but the realtors and mortgage companies told them they could afford the mortgage payments and then lied about their credit and income to get them FHA mortgages. Of course, many defaulted under the tremendous burden of the mortgage payments. FHA lenders swiftly foreclosed, knowing that they could not lose a dime because the federal government had insured their loan 100 per cent. The foreclosures and repossessions by FHA left dozens of abandoned, boarded-up homes. The homes attracted vandals, arsonists, terrorist gangs, and other criminal elements. The neighborhood was fast becoming the slum they had moved out of only a few years earlier.

With this understanding, Blacks and whites began to work together — not out of brotherly love or because they favored integration — but out of a common interest to stop neighborhood deterioration. Blacks and whites

saw that if FHA abuses, redlining and panic peddling were ended, a lot of the tension would disappear and the rapid racial turnover would end. Neighborhoods would have a chance to become stable where people would be free to move in or out without coercion.

By early 1975, CAP could point to some impressive accomplishments. The redlining fight had brought tremendous expansion. A new offensive tactic, the “Greenlining” pledge campaign, showed organizations how to use a potentially awesome weapon — their own money. In the greenlining campaign, pledges were solicited from every neighborhood resident to invest their savings accounts *only* in banks and savings and loan associations that agreed to reinvest in their neighborhoods. Specific dollar amounts for reinvestment would be set on the basis of the ratio of savings to loans that a financial institution held in a specific community. In essence, CAP demanded that the bankers recognize the neighborhood organizations as representatives of their local depositors and negotiate with them for the use of their money.

The power of greenlining

At the April 6, 1975, CAP convention, \$120 million in greenlining pledges were held by CAP. Three financial institutions had signed contracts with local groups to reinvest in their neighborhoods. Realtors even reported that other institutions were suddenly making loans in areas where they had been redlining. (For more on Greenlining, see Ron Dorfman’s excellent article in the Summer, 1975 issue of *Working Papers for a New Society*.)

While CAP concentrated on greenlining, the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA), a loose coalition of church-sponsored groups concerned with housing issues, developed a legislative strategy. They negotiated and lobbied for new state and federal laws and regulations to end both redlining and FHA abuses. The combined pressure of CAP and MAHA resulted in some major developments.

At CAP and MAHA’s request, Illinois Governor Dan Walker appointed a blue ribbon panel to investigate redlining and FHA abuses. As a result of the panel’s report and concerted pressure by CAP and MAHA, Illinois has the first laws in the nation prohibiting redlining by financial institutions, with criminal penalties, and requiring disclosure of all mortgages by zip code from every lender in the state.

After several demonstrations and two stormy negotiating sessions with CAP and MAHA, the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago was forced to conduct a survey of savings and loan associations’ lending patterns which, despite denials, confirmed the existence of redlining. The City of Chicago passed an ordinance prohibiting redlining by institutions which accepted city deposits. Each applicant for a chunk of the several hundred million dollars of city deposits was required to sign an annual anti-redlining pledge and provide detailed disclosure of savings and checking accounts and mortgages, home improvement loans, etc., for every neighborhood.

The FHA fight also won some important victories. A week-long, front-page *Chicago Tribune* series, sparked by MAHA and CAP efforts, catalogued FHA scandals. Subsequently, a congressional investigation was launched by Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III. The large downtown banks, under some prodding from Chicago Mayor Daley, began to get interested in rehabilitating hundreds of the boarded up HUD-owned homes, while local affiliates of CAP were confronting their local banks to do the same thing. With the threat of greenlining if they didn’t cooperate, several banks have recently expressed interest in starting rehabilitation programs.

A nationwide coalition in the making

In the sixties, the classic community organization was a neighborhood organization only, unaffiliated with any larger organization. This greatly limited their scope. After a few years they usually became very parochial, eventually being bought off by corporations or turning into agencies for the distribution of government money and jobs. The existence of isolated, fragmented community organizations allowed the political and corporate interests to pit one neighborhood against another, preventing groups from discovering their common antagonists and working together to solve problems, such as in St. Louis or in Kansas City.

CAP showed that a metropolitan organization is viable, if not crucial to the continued existence and growth of direct action organizations.

A metropolitan-wide organization is necessary to *really* solve community problems, such as neighborhood deterioration, the lack of jobs, poor housing, inadequate transportation. One neighborhood organization alone cannot expect to win investment from powerful financial institutions and corporations, or end FHA abuses, or pass new legislation and city ordinances, or stop multi-billion dollar highway projects.

Metropolitan CAP-style organizations are now going in, at least, a dozen cities including San Francisco, Seattle, San Antonio, Dallas, Milwaukee, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Cleveland, Boston, and smaller cities. The logic of metropolitan organizations has helped show the need for statewide organizations, such as the Arkansas Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) (see Summer 1975 issue of *Working Papers for a New Society* or the October 1975 issue of *The Progressive* for excellent articles on ACORN by Andrew Kepkind), South Dakota ACORN, Massachusetts Fair Share, and statewide organizations in various stages of formation in California, Wisconsin, Illinois, New Jersey, and Vermont. As these organizations grow and expand, networks are being tentatively formed to marshal resources to go into new areas and begin new organizations. The idea of a national federation of large direct action organizations is implicit in these activities, although it has not yet been realized. Metropolitan and statewide organizations around the country already have shown they have some ability to define the major political issues in their areas. Within a few years we may see a national federation of these organizations powerful enough to define some crucial issues for the country, and create enough pressure at the local level to win some impressive victories. An example of the potential of such a federation is the recently Senate-passed mortgage disclosure bill for banks and S&Ls, sponsored by U.S. Senator William Proxmire. This landmark bill came about through relatively uncoordinated pressure from several organizations around the country fighting redlining.

Another important innovation in community organizing is the growth of door-to-door solicitation as a reliable and stable technique to raise relatively large amounts of money. Money has always been a key problem in organizing. Many organizations fold because their treasuries run dry. Countless others succumb to government money or restrictive foundation grants and become less vital and militant as a result. Getting foundation and church support is erratic — you can be rich one month and poor the next; financial planning and budgeting is nearly impossible; often staff members are paid irregularly and at “missionary mentality” salaries.

Door-to-door solicitation was pioneered by the Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), a Chicago-based environmental group, and successfully copied by CAP beginning in 1972. This technique is now used by organizations from San Francisco to Boston. Solicitation is run like a business. Canvassers are hired on commission to go door to door to request contributions, gain members, and peddle newsletter subscriptions. In a nutshell, they “sell” the organization — its public accomplishments, what it’s done for the neighborhood, its future plans, etc. A good solicitation operation in a major metropolitan area can gross a quarter of a million dollars a year, in a reliable and predictable manner. It is completely owned and operated by the organization — no compromises with foundations, corporations, or government are involved.

A lot of potential

With these innovations in community organizing metropolitan and statewide organizations, slowly emerging national vision, plus the potential of door-to-door solicitation — can organizations like CAP begin to turn the country around? Clearly working- and middle-class people are being hit hard by inflation, decaying cities, unemployment, poor schools, and an overall erosion of the quality of life. Polls show that they have lost confidence in government and big business. They are extremely cynical, but they are extremely angry. During four years at CAP, this writer saw dozens of these people get turned on to the real possibilities of change and become resourceful, dynamic community leaders through a learning process involving militant direct action resulting in *winning real victories*.

Organizations like CAP, therefore, have a lot of potential. However, they will have to contend with several problems if they are to be able to grow and maintain themselves over the long period of time necessary to build a movement that can affect real social change:

1. Community organizations like CAP are fragile. Their base is not institutionalized, as with a trade union. People tend to come and go, staying only if the organization is producing for them. There are no “stable” community organizations. They must grow rapidly, otherwise they wither and die.

2. Fragility can be compounded by a *lack of vision*. Talented people will not stick around without adequate reasons. Therefore, it is not sufficient to fight only on a series of issues. Organizations must self-consciously instill a vision in their membership that working- and middle-class people’s fundamental problem is a *lack of political and economic power*. The long-run goal of the organization then becomes that of giving people control over their own lives. Some organizers tend to forget this point midst day-to-day fights on specific issues.

3. Many community organizations have overly strong egos which operate as a hindrance to coalition building. Coalitions based on mutual respect are essential — not just between different community organizations, but also with labor and other groups fighting for social change.

4. Talented organizers must be trained in much larger numbers. Presently, qualified people who can direct a serious organizing project in large cities are in short supply.

People are looking for a change. Yet, few politicians have the courage to come up with real answers to the problems that are facing this nation. If people can be shown that by their own actions they can change things for the better through mass-based popular organizations like CAP, then a majority progressive, non-racist working and middle-class movement for social change is possible.

Building a Black Community: Popular Economics in



LAWNDALE.

by Harold M. Baron

Daniel Pearl/mutter

One of the great recurring themes in American history is the tenacity of Black people in surviving midst the almost insuperable odds of a pervasive racist system. Set-backs have followed victories. Yet, with a stubborn will Black people have not given in – they built and rebuilt their families, their institutions and their communities. An interesting episode in this historical process is taking place in the North Lawndale community, three miles west and a little south of Chicago's Loop.

By all indices of standard social science and conventional wisdom, North Lawndale should not survive as a community, let alone grow in strength. Disaster might best describe the almost three-mile stretch of Roosevelt Road, the major commercial strip that goes through the community. The property has suffered the ravages of the marketplace: declining purchasing power as Black families, many of whom were employed in marginal jobs or received public assistance, moved in, and now many are moving out; competition to the west and south from small- and medium-sized shopping centers with their two square feet of parking for every square foot of shopping. Many other commercial streets in Chicago have suffered a similar fate, but what distinctively marks off Roosevelt Road, and one or two other streets on the westside, is yet another factor – the destruction wrought by the rebellious acts of Black youths in the riots of the late sixties. Frustrated by a system that was rigged against them and unable to obtain redress through legitimate channels, many of the young people of Lawndale literally took up the torch as a political weapon. Fury mixed with protest left many burned out buildings along Roosevelt Road after the rebellion of the summer of 1966 and the one that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. two years later.

This protest did receive a response from federal and local governments. With great ballyhoo large-scale funding was suddenly heaped upon emergency programs for jobs, housing and social services. With less publicity repression and cooptation were also applied. Some youth gang leaders were sent to Dartmouth College, others to Stateville Penitentiary. Now in the mid-seventies, North Lawndale no longer shows the raw scars like those of a city just after an air raid. The burned out buildings have been bulldozed and grass now grows in their place. The emergency programs too have disappeared.

90,000 Black people still remain in North Lawndale. Undaunted by the experts' projections of data, they still confront the struggle to forge a viable social community and to make the physical surroundings decent ones to live in.

Today, the single most important institutional force in the struggle to forge a new community is the North Lawndale Economic Development Corporation. Like the neighborhood as a whole, NLEDC has had its trials and tribulations, and has yet to get underway with full steam. But it does embody a vision and with tenacity expresses a will to survive and flourish. The physical setting of its office, a solitary double storefront on Roosevelt Road, the only building left standing on a block done in by

firebombs and the bulldozer, symbolizes the institution. No major new project has yet to come to fruition, but it hangs in there as a stubborn testimony of grit and determination.

Before going into the details of NLEDC's program, we ought to get more of an idea of the community. Originally, it was settled by German and Irish, with the major construction having taken place between 1890 and World War I. By 1915, Russian Jews had moved and bought their way in so that North Lawndale was theirs. "Lawndale, when the Jewish settlers arrived," wrote Louis Wirth in *The Ghetto*, "was a quiet residential zone of lower middle-class standards. It had spacious streets, yards, and parks, many wide open spaces, and substantial duplex apartments." Thriving industrial plants and warehouses lined the railroad tracks. The key economic enterprise in the neighborhood was the Sears, Roebuck complex – the corporate headquarters, the main mail order plant, and a major retail store.

By the mid-1950s the rapidly growing Black population of Chicago had become the predominant group residing in the neighborhood. At first, many of the Blacks were professionals, civil servants and well-established working class people. But the civic and political center of Chicago's Black community remained on the southside, and Lawndale soon became essentially a blue-collar area whose working population tended to be unskilled with a tenuous position in the labor market. In comparison to the southside, some hold that the people on the westside, having more recently come from the rural South, are more open and friendly. The housing stock, already somewhat neglected during the Great Depression and World War II, was ruthlessly milked for cash returns by speculators and landlords who had left the neighborhood. Much of the housing is dilapidated and run down. Some dwellings have been abandoned, burned or bulldozed. Many commercial and industrial buildings have suffered a similar fate. Sears, a couple of years ago, moved its headquarters to the world's tallest building in the Loop, and Sears Bank – the last one left in the area – made the same journey. The giant retailer's employment in Lawndale was almost cut in half.

Valiant efforts to build the social structure of a new community were put forward by Black families and individuals. Churches were founded or moved into the neighborhood. The attack on overcrowded ghetto schools that was to become the focal point of the Chicago civil rights movement in the early 1960s was initiated in Lawndale. Individuals started a long hard battle to become part of the powerful 24th Ward Democratic Organization. In ways that were not often socially approved, Black youths consolidated local street gangs into large powerful organizations such as the Egyptian Cobras and the Vice Lords. However, this struggle to forge a new community proved to be most difficult as it came up against massive political, social and economic forces which usually functioned in a racist and oppressive manner.

The upsurge of the civil rights movement brought new energy to this community formation process. What has

been personal local efforts became mass public actions and issues for the entire metropolis. Various religious organizations and leaders banded together to form the West Side Federation, an organization that simultaneously developed a program oriented to community development and self-determination, and related to the citywide civil rights movement's joint campaign with Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Establish community-based corporation

As is frequent in community organizing, the surfacing of an enemy provided the focal point for the mobilization of diverse forces. A major Chicago real estate developer had made a big investment in the first phase of a plan for much of Lawndale. Its objective was to insulate the giant Sears headquarters complex from the westside Black community. In response, an ad hoc group of Lawndale organizations pulled together in 1967 with the West Side Federation to sponsor a conference called: "Today's Lawndale: Black Colony - Tomorrow's Lawndale: New City." Although the real estate promoter's plan for a Sears' island in a Black sea seems never to have been considered politically feasible in Mayor Daley's City Hall, it did serve to promote two important Black organizations in Lawndale.

Out of the conference and its follow up work in the next year, the Lawndale Peoples Planning and Action Committee (LPPAC) - was formed in a merger of several of the more important community organizations with the West Side Federation. This new entity was in a much better position to function as the forum and spokesman for the entire community. Outside forces now had a more difficult time of moving in and playing one small interest group off against another in order to achieve their own ends. The other institution founded in 1968 was the North Lawndale Economic Development Corporation (NLEDC). One of the sources of NLEDC was a group of men around Presentation Parish who had been stimulated by the pastor, Msgr. John Egan. At that time Egan, the dean of Chicago's liberal priests, had been exiled to Lawndale by the Cardinal. He had pointed out to these men, basically working class people buying homes on contract, that they would have to take initiative in the rebuilding of the area if they were to exercise general leadership in the community. Their plans were not very specific or large-scale. Meanwhile LPPAC had been advised by its outside professional planners to set up an economic development corporation which could take advantage of recent federal legislation for economically distressed areas. The two groups, having similar goals, merged to give NLEDC its present form. On the recommendation of the technical consultants, NLEDC was to be a separate, but parallel organization to the community group - a for-profit company, owned by a broad range of Lawndale residents, which would develop large-scale housing and commercial projects as part of an overall plan for the revitalization of the community. The objective was to counter the larger forces at work in the economy and shore up an economic base upon which a vital community could be constructed.

Today the development corporation has eclipsed its parent community organization in size and influence, but it has maintained, as essential to its being, a partnership relation with the community and its component institutions. The maintenance of the vitality of LPPAC is a key-stone in its long-range strategy. NLEDC, true to its origins, gives greater priority to the objectives of community development than to the profit maximizing goals of a private corporation. This stance provides its greatest strength and potential and, on the other hand, in terms of day to day operations its most serious vulnerability. A

fundamental proposition is being tested: Can a business enterprise survive if its main motive is derived from a vision of building a viable community from a predominantly working-class and poor Black population.

The strategy of North Lawndale Economic Development Corp. is to take the funds that were shaken loose by the great Black protests and political movements of the sixties and to gain the greatest possible leverage from them, i.e. to establish the kind of economic institutions that continuously feed-back vitality to the rest of the community's institutions rather than to drain them as is more typical in the case of a Black ghetto. The potentiality of this economic strategy is seen as providing a foundation for the people of Lawndale to develop sufficient strength in their social relationships that they have the capacity to proceed with a considerable degree of civic and political self-reliance.

In a memorandum to his staff Cecil Butler, NLEDC's president and general manager, clearly laid out the challenge:

Of course, in this day and time, it is impossible for any area to claim that any area within a city - or a city, state, region or nation to claim - to be an independent economy because of the interdependence not only among various cities, regions and nations but throughout the world as a whole. The best that we can expect to do is to become limited producers of goods that have some value to other areas and to be capable of generating enough income to support the inhabitants of this community. To do this would relieve the area of the stigma of being a welfare, government supported poverty area; it would generate the savings and investments required to produce the housing, commercial and business investment that grows from the capacity to save and the expenditure of earnings. Further, it would produce public revenue that would enable the area to claim the capability of supporting its own public and private institutions, industry, schools, public services, charities, churches and the whole range of institutions that supplement and perpetuate the society.

No other community development plan conceives its responsibility so broadly or perceives such an expanded program for itself. Yet, in a community that has no jobs because industry has left by the hundreds, in an area that has no commercial services and facilities because they have been destroyed or left for safer and better places, in a place where there are no financial institutions which provide either services or investments for the community and in a place where there are no savings or desires for investments there is hardly an alternative. Either we address the problem at its foundation or we engage in piecemeal activities which have no reasonable potential for impact on the problem of the absence of an economy.

Mix community and business interests

The magnitude of the vision is what makes NLEDC's plans so intriguing. Tapping into funds originally provided by the War on Poverty for area redevelopment, the corporation has obtained grants of \$15 million for capital development and authorization for another \$4 million. Investment is targeted for industrial, commercial and financial projects. The object is to foster projects that will circulate and recirculate money through the community. As Cecil Butler puts it, "What we are looking for is a

mechanism that will create an impetus that will regenerate itself. Money is the fuel and you have to keep it in the community." Residential projects and service programs, in which the money tends to flow through the community once and then out again, originally were given a lower priority and promoted only where they fit in with the overall strategy. However, when the 1974-75 recession slowed down the timetables on the commercial and industrial projects, increased attention was placed on residential activity. Currently, NLEDC manages some 600 housing units for the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development which acquired them through defaulted mortgages it had guaranteed. Plans for new housing for the elderly are underway.

There has been little agonizing over where the money originally comes from and whether the motive in granting it was cooptation or as a cooling out concession. The overriding issue has been how to take the money and build so that the community can become its own master in the future.

Capital development plans are centered on three major projects. The Lawndale Plaza Shopping Center, to be located on the site surrounding the present office, has been under consideration virtually since the founding of the organization. Plans are to build a center with 383,000 square feet of shopping space on a 16-acre site, featuring one or two major department stores to attract trade from a wide area. A supermarket would provide another welcomed addition, as there are only a couple within the whole of North Lawndale. Ground will still not be broken on this project for another year as the land acquisition process has been tediously slow. Original plans for funding through the Department of Housing and Urban Development fell through because of a bureaucratic hassle between the City of Chicago and the federal government. NLEDC did receive the funds to purchase the land from the old Office of Economic Opportunity and finally was able to arrange a contract with the City for its bureau to acquire the land and relocate the tenants. The major portion of this task has now been accomplished. Throughout this period considerable staff time was invested in working with a series of prospective tenants, often to have the effort come to nought because of the delays.

The most ambitious project involves the development of an industrial park on the site of the giant, old International Harvester plant, between California and Western, 26th and 31st streets, just south of the community. All told, 96 acres with good railroad and highway access are involved. A portion of this land has been set aside for a health care park, and construction is underway on the first phase, a 300-bed nursing center that will provide over 100 jobs. Fourteen acres of land targeted for industry has been made ready for development with water and sewers. Still not a single industrial building has been put up. NLEDC has held out for tenants that would provide employment to the community through labor intensive operations — hopefully for a total of 2600 jobs — rather than take the first deals offered for truck depots and warehouses that would take up large chunks of land but require few workers for their operations. Deals have fallen through. Leasing agents, used to propositions that only depended upon profit-oriented decisions, have not had the patience to hang in with a community oriented and operated developer which also constantly had to work through slow moving federal agencies.

Ironically, the Community Bank of Lawndale, the project that was the last in conception, most likely will be the first completed. NLEDC, which will own 90% of the stock, is seeking Federal Reserve Board approval as a bankholding company, under a special provision allowing

a non-financial institution whose major purpose is to serve the community's welfare to qualify as a holding company. Almost all the other governmental approval and paperwork has been accomplished, and the prospective bank officers are hired. The bank will fill a much needed service function as the nearest bank is now five miles away. "The bank," President Butler explains, "is a natural complement to the comprehensive development plan. If the plan is successful in generating a cash flow, we will control the investment." He foresees NLEDC's own operations providing a sizeable chunk of this cash flow. A feasibility study prepared by a Northwestern University accounting professor predicts \$8 million in deposits three years after opening. The community will, therefore, have funds available for loans several times the original capital investment. Obviously the loans will have to be sound ones, but presently other financial institutions with no commitment to the community will hardly put any money in there no matter how good the risk.

A unique board of directors

The financial structure of NLEDC and its affiliated groups is indeed complex. Fifteen million dollars of basic funding has come directly from the federal government under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and subsequent War on Poverty legislation on the grounds that because of the seriousness of its economic problems North Lawndale constitutes a Special Impact Area. Contrary to the case for most War on Poverty funding, this money did not go through City Hall but went directly to the community development corporation. Independence in funding provided bargaining leverage with city agencies and protected the program from subordination to Mayor Daley's overall political strategies.

NLEDC is set up as a publicly held stock corporation, even with authorization from the Securities and Exchange Commission. Voting stock can only be held by residents of Lawndale with a maximum of 20 shares for any one individual. Currently almost 600 people are stockholders. The bulk of the money invested by federal agencies is held as non-voting stock by a trust over which the majority of the trustees are appointed by Lawndale Peoples Planning and Action Council. Any dividends that might be paid out on this stock is to be used by LPPAC for community and economic development. Additionally there is a non-profit subsidiary set up to receive public works planning and technical assistance grants from the federal government. The intricacy of these arrangements give a good idea of the technical competency that NLEDC has had to develop. It has been necessary to put together a sophisticated staff that knows how to wheel and deal on Chicago's LaSalle Street and in Washington, D.C.'s agencies. At the same time provision has been made for the ultimate control of the organization by the community and its members.

The Board of Directors is unique for a venture with assets way up in the millions: bus driver, teacher, machine operator, beautician, social worker, hardware store owner, pastor, etc. The Chairman of the Board is Robert LaFlore, a former railroad freight handler and currently an employment counselor on a project giving high school dropouts on-the-job training in how to rehabilitate housing. He was one of the original founders of NLEDC. When you talk to this soft-spoken, but forceful Black man, you soon discover that most of his impressive training came on the job in the community struggles of Lawndale. Drives for the sale of stock provide further outreach and helps shape a core of activists and people closely identified with the program. Stockholders take the Board seriously. In contrast to the usual private corporation,

there have been heated contests for election to the Board at the annual meeting.

In any modern corporation the management, through its expertise and control over day to day operations, tends to dominate the stockholders. NLEDC is no exception to this proposition, although it comes pretty close to it for great care is taken to have the Board make fundamental policy decisions. Cecil Butler, the president, is a 37-year-old attorney whose work in Lawndale goes all the way back to the West Side Federation. Fresh out of Northwestern University Law School, he was one of the first Blacks employed in a professional capacity by a major Loop bank. But Butler did not see himself as an "organization man" and moved into activist legal work before coming to work in Lawndale. Admiration for Cecil Butler's capabilities is near universal in Lawndale and among the people who do business with NLEDC. The Rev. Shelvin Hall, the most important single figure in the founding of the West Side Federation and LPPAC, points out that Butler could get things done that the religious leaders couldn't: "In him, you had the key man at the key time - a man who knew how to cut red tape and get things done in Washington." What criticism there is of Butler generally takes the form that the organization is too dependent upon him.

The burden on the chief executive of NLEDC is great and conflicting. Pressures from the business community and the government push him to get just about any kind of project completed. The vision of the organization impells him to avoid deals that do not implement the long term objectives of development, like fast food projects and ventures that employ few people. A member of his Business Advisory Committee from a prestigious Loop company pushes for professionalism: "They will have to develop the capacity to put together a package. They will have to develop it on their staff or hire it from the outside. Industrial development is a professional operation and you need a pro to do it." From the other direction, a Board member claims the professional staff tends to get too far ahead of the lay leadership: "They should also be a teacher to develop the Board. I wish that they would have started some little things to develop and train neighborhood people." Cecil Butler takes all these pressures seriously and plows on. So far, when push comes to shove, he has bent more to the community than to the business pressures. Regarding the Board, he says, "I take it more seriously because it is the kind of board it is. I would like to look around and say we did this without it coming from downtown or the business community."

Mrs. Anne Joyner, President of LPPAC, puts forth a similar sentiment, "I would like to be part of rebuilding a community. If I didn't, I would have given up a long time ago." Rev. Hall, who is also a member of the NLEDC Board, amplifies, "If this is going to be a viable community, Black people will have to build it this time. It is the burden, the duty and the responsibility of Black citizens."

The basic integrity of NLEDC's concern for the community is shown by the staff's and Board's concern for assuring the vitality of Lawndale Peoples Planning and Action Council. With the waning of the 1960s movement, LPPAC like every other voluntary activist groups suffered a decline. With things going badly, certain frictions inevitably developed between it and its well funded relative, the economic development corporation. These differences were not allowed to get out of hand. For a while Rev. Hall went back and assumed the executive directorship of LPPAC to bolster its food cooperative and its newspaper, *The Lawndale Drum*. This year, Cecil Butler's burdens were added to by his appointment as LPPAC's executive. The move is meant as a temporary one until the finances

and programs of the organization are expanded and stabilized.

For NLEDC to succeed in its community development strategy, it needs a strong, representative community partner. As Rev. Hall says in his characteristic pithy style, "It does not make sense to have a rich husband and a poor wife." Mrs. Joyner pointed out, "There has to be a community organization to deal with social needs. An economic development corporation can't do that." Recognizing that its legitimacy requires a strong community institution, NLEDC is developing plans with LPPAC for the latter to perform liaison tasks in a job training program for drivers of heavy trucks and in the screening of personnel for the bank.

Aim is to build economic base

In the political arena, the strategy has been to play interest group politics. The principal figures of NLEDC and LPPAC have not become involved in independent, anti-machine electoral campaigns. They have worked to involve the power of the regular Democratic organization in supporting the community development strategy. The existence of NLEDC's programs and the hope that they inspired, played an important role in bringing about the recent construction of Lawndale's first high school. Butler sees the building of a viable economic base as enabling the people of Lawndale to make social and political choices: "We don't want to determine the political future of the area - whether it will continue to return 98% Democratic ballots. But we do want people to exercise an option and not feel compelled to vote a particular way because they are on relief."

NLEDC's program of working with the current business system gives it leverage to get things done and to implement a large strategy. At the same time the nature of the business system is perhaps its biggest problem. In this era of giant corporations, NLEDC's \$15 million is small potatoes. Due to the disparity in size, the competition can overwhelm NLEDC. More importantly the name of the game in business is profits, even if that requires the subordination of community and people. A private capitalist venture can, and has to, move out of a community if that course of action is necessary for its survival. Quite to the contrary, business survival for the economic development corporation is inextricably tied to the well-being of its particular community. NLEDC, not having the flexibility of its private competition, has to live with the investments it makes.

Whether North Lawndale Economic Development Corp. succeeds in its strategy of building an economic base for a new community is not a certainty by any means. For example, Chicago, not counting the suburbs, has some 24,000,000 square feet of vacant industrial space to compete with the industrial park. There is always great pressure and temptation to narrow down the program for the purposes of producing a good financial statement, which would willy-nilly downgrade the broad community objectives. Tension exists between the immediate requirements for technical expertise to run complex ventures and the long-range goal of empowering the community so that it is master in its own house.

But whatever the final outcome, NLEDC will have served a key role of providing a vision bold enough to mobilize tremendous energies. It has become the focal point of the will to survive. It has trained leaders and built networks of social relationships that any community requires to be vital. Whenever opportunity presents itself or crisis befalls, North Lawndale will have a new capacity to act.


I'd rather see the whole Goddamned local go under than have a bunch of niggers and Puerto Ricans runnin it.

James Mitchell, first president of Local 571, shortly after the 1969 strike

We have also been hearing about the fear coming from some white workers that feel that Black and Latin workers want their jobs. **THIS IS NOT TRUE!!!** Our position is that since 82% of the work force at Hotpoint is Black and Latin, it is only right that we try to monitor the union leadership. The benefits that we have wrested from the union will ultimately benefit all workers . . .

plant leaflet of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, May 3, 1974

**What
Happened
at**



The Election at Local 571 May, 1974

by John Higginson

John Higginson teaches history at Northern Illinois University. He is currently finishing a dissertation on the making of the Congolese working class in the copper regions of Zaire.

In May of 1974 a loose, but highly visible coalition of Black and Latin workers at the massive General Electric-Hotpoint works on Chicago's far westside ushered into office a new union slate in Local 571 of the *Sheet Metal Workers International of America* (SMWIA). The slate, headed by Roger Earskins, was openly known even by the company to have "radical" leanings. Yet by the end of the election campaign it received ineffective opposition from the previous union leadership and their supporting factions of white production workers.

Two strikes — a wildcat in 1967 and a union-led strike of 1969 — provided the impulse for the Black and Spanish speaking workers to tear at the web of powerlessness that had severely compromised their participation in union and shop affairs. Their limited participation under the old union set-up was ironic, as they comprised the majority of production workers within the factory complex. However, the development of labor-management relationships at Hotpoint can only be understood within a whole complex of broader labor market, political, and ethnic and racial factors on both the Chicago and national scenes.

Before the 1960s the majority of work force at Hotpoint was Eastern European. Many were American born, having moved westward towards the industrial suburbs of Cicero and Berwyn, at least partly to flee the first waves of Black migrants who came to settle on Chicago's westside in large numbers from 1950 on. Others were European born and had fled the chaos of the post-World War II scene there. Lacking a familiarity with American industrial trade unionism and bent upon demonstrating to management their willingness to work, these Polish, Luthuanian and Serbian workers entered the Hotpoint factory expecting little beyond a chance to produce a larger number of refrigerators, stoves and profits for General Electric. The United Electrical Workers (UE), under red-baiting attacks from both management and other unions, lost its representation of the plant. From 1951 to 1957 — when these Eastern European workers were increasing in

numbers — Hotpoint pulled significantly ahead of its closest competitors in output and productivity.

Management pursued a flexible policy of paternalism and maximum insulation of its white ethnic employees. Hotpoint executives distributed a fair amount of patronage to the foreign language newspapers and local businesses in Cicero. Strikes and an abundant flow of grievances were virtually unheard of during this period.

The uniqueness of Hotpoint within the GE empire rests with its exclusive concentration on the production of durable consumer goods (refrigerators, stoves, air conditioners) as opposed to larger capital goods items. The mass production of these consumer goods calls for large quantities of unskilled and semi-skilled labor to perform the repetitious, boring and fast-paced jobs. This category of work was a major one for which the demand for Black and Latin labor vastly increased during the prolonged, wartime economic boom of the 1960s. White workers moved up to maintenance and other skilled jobs, or left altogether for more congenial places of employment.

On July 27, 1967, a wildcat strike at the General Electric-Hotpoint works dramatically demonstrated the extent of transformation that the company's work force had undergone. On the eve of the strike of the plant's 3,800 workers, almost 64% of the unskilled production workers were Blacks, recruited primarily from the adjacent Lawn-dale district of Chicago. Another 11 percent were either Mexican-American or Puerto Rican. Over a third of this group were women. Concentrated strategically at the very heart of the factory complex in building no. 59, plant no. 2 and no. 8 north of Roosevelt Road and Laramie, these workers were in a position to disrupt the entire works. This fundamental change in the core group of production workers at Hotpoint — from white ethnics to Black and Spanish speaking operatives — coupled with entrance of Local 571 of SMWIA into the shops would prove to be the cutting edge of a new era of industrial relations at the Hotpoint works — from management's point of view, an era pregnant with the seeds of new and dangerous forms of labor conflict.

Saddled with the most dangerous and grueling working conditions, the least seniority and outraged by the inaction of the older, more secure white workers, Black workers from the day shift of the three above-mentioned plants almost spontaneously shut down their lines and walked out of the complex shortly after the second lunch break at 2:15 P.M. The specific incident that sparked the strike involved a foreman pressuring a Black worker to shut down a line and reset it for an operation not in his job specification. Communication through the informal networks of Blacks in the plant organized the counteraction within a couple of days. The walk-out of July 27 was the first wildcat strike that the local management team had experienced since the mid 1940s, and also the first sign of a growing sense of militancy among the younger Black workers of the factory complex. The estimates on exactly how many Blacks participated in this initial strike vary according to the source.

These Black strikers were as affected by the events surrounding the nation-wide civil rights movement and the more localized campaign for better jobs and housing for Blacks on Chicago's westside as they were by increasing output rates for piece-work and deteriorating safety standards in the plants. The summer of 1967 saw the demands for better jobs and housing orchestrated at a level of intensity not seen before in Chicago. Two events — a housing march into the western suburb of Cicero led by Martin Luther King and the brutal slaying of a Black youth, Jerome Huey, by a group of whites while in search

of work in that same industrial suburb — riveted the attention of the entire city on these two thorny problems of urban industrial life.

One of the workers, who surfaced as a leader of the wildcat strike movement, had this to say about the latter series of events on the attitudes of Black workers at Hotpoint: "Most of us were pretty shook up by what happened to that kid; especially since he was just looking for some honest work. It just made us all the more fed up with the way things were going on the lines and on the shop floor in general."

When the initiative of the all-Black wildcat began to fizzle from the lack of a clear direction and program, new life was breathed into the action as a respectable contingent of Mexican-American and dissident white workers joined the work stoppage and helped extend its duration to three days. The move of white workers joining the wildcat did not come from the more established Slavic group. As these workers left the production lines through retirement and by moving up or out to better jobs, Appalachian whites joined the minority group workers in filling their places in the shop and, to a certain extent, in the nearby white neighborhoods. The Appalachians, with a more tenuous and less favored position at Hotpoint, brought the white support to the walkout.

The wildcat strike proved to be a crisis that shook up the various accommodations that had been developed over the years. In the first round of give and take management had clearly been the loser, but it did get a few licks in. The inner circle of leadership who triggered the strike among the Black workers was fired, including its most visible leader, Willie Plunkett. However, Hotpoint was obliged to implement a spate of job upgrading programs for Blacks and other "disadvantaged" workers. One training program was set up by Rev. Leon Sullivan's Philadelphia headquartered Opportunities Industrialization Centers and another was operated under General Electric's own program for meeting the employment demands of the civil rights movement. In a contract with Local 571 of the Sheet Metal Workers which won bargaining rights at Hotpoint shortly after the strike, the company was forced to take into account the "local realities" in the plant — piece work, high labor turnover, speed-up — and conceded some improvements in working conditions. They also agreed to a more or less clearcut system of seniority and retirement benefits.

"Fed-up with the way things were going"

The Sheet Metal Workers is predominantly an old-line AFL craft union with a minority of its contracts covering production workers and a national leadership that is oriented to the interests of skilled construction and maintenance workers. After the wildcat strike the workers were stirred up and very receptive to the idea of a union. SMWIU moved into a favorable scene. Hotpoint, in contrast to its hounding of the militant, left-led UE in the McCarthy era, offered no opposition to unionization this time and quickly signed a contract with the new Local 571. Representation by a craft union of a newly aroused mass production work force was to lay the ground for internal struggle within the local, with an implicit division of the membership along racial lines.

Unionization brought the Hotpoint works into the 1969 national strike against GE. Collective bargaining with GE is conducted by a coalition of several unions that hold contracts for the giant firm's different plants. The union coalition decided that this was the time to

break General Electric's take it or leave it pattern of bargaining. It took a strike of over 100 days to get the company to agree to more than its original wage offer. The conduct of the strike at Hotpoint raised some serious questions in the workers' minds regarding the financial management of the local and many complaints that much of the strike benefit funds were not getting to the membership. Perhaps more importantly, the mobilization of the rank and file for the conduct of the strike rekindled their self-confidence and assertiveness.

Resurgence of militancy follows broken promises

The impetus the nation-wide GE strike gave to the workers carried through to the placing of charges of embezzlement against the local's first president and a short-lived coup that took over union leadership. This new array of union factions in power could have been construed as "progressive," as for a brief interim a Black worker, Roger Earskins, was president. However, the temporary interests of white union leaders and management soon came together with the accession of "Hillbilly" Jim Crouch to the presidency of the local. The new leadership was able to cut off organized and legitimate opposition by virtually silencing the shop stewards committees through a usurpation of the local's by-laws. The stewards' function was to provide a direct voice to the various small production units and to service grievances from them. Therefore, the company benefited from this move as they were now able to put on a squeeze for production with lesser chance of a counter action. Soon workers' gains from the 1967 wildcat and the 1969 nationwide strikes were being whittled away.

In exchange for the company making a public show of recognizing his leadership, Crouch and his SMWIA administration relented on pushing forward those items of the contract that spoke explicitly to the needs of assembly line and production workers. Most significantly the union remained silent with respect to the introduction of time keepers or MTS (Motion Time Study) men to each assembly line and job area in the central plants. Production rates for the nine lowest job categories were upped from 150 pieces an hour to somewhere between 170 and 200 pieces. As a matter of course, the speed-up affected Black and Latin workers almost exclusively.

Hotpoint took liberties with the terms of the new contract with the full knowledge and implicit approval of the prevailing union leadership. Accident rates and violent confrontations between workers and foremen, particularly Black and Latin workers and white foremen, predictably increased in 1970-71.

The remedying of the more outstanding grievances shortly after the 1969 strike had proved only temporary. Conditions in the plants where Black and Spanish speaking workers were in the majority were now approximating those of a runaway shop. Racial tensions between white and minority workers ebbed and flowed on a day-to-day basis. These developments, coupled with the tremendous loss of power by the shop stewards committees under Crouch, set the stage for a resurgence of militancy on the part of the union's Black and Latin constituency.

Form League of Revolutionary Black Workers

Out of the two strikes the younger Black workers had gained increased confidence in their ability to deal with the line foremen in their individual departments. With the shop committees under the personal control of Crouch,

these workers had to operate outside the formal union structure. They began in 1971 a series of staggered slow-downs and issued leaflets to their departments that sharply exposed their plight. During these actions they were successful in keeping the more repressive foremen at bay. Within one year the muckraking character of the departmental leaflets, which villified individual foremen and highlighted their laxness in maintaining the minimum safety standards, had forged the pre-conditions for a works-wide organization among the younger Black and Latin workers.

Instrumental in forming the Black and Latin Coalition was the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, a nationalist oriented group that was influenced by the tactics of a much larger organization with the same name in Detroit. The Detroit League had been successful in organizing the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM) and similar outfits in several other plants. Across the country younger Black production workers, especially in auto and steel, operating under the influence of Black oriented radical ideologies and taking advantage of the room for maneuver opened by the then tight labor markets, put together a number of militant Black coalitions or in some cases union caucuses. At Hotpoint people related to the League had been involved in the departmental actions and were in a position to stimulate the formation of a works-wide caucus and strategy.

The entrance of New Left forces upon the Hotpoint scene had the effect of solidifying the Black and Latin Coalition. The October League and the Revolutionary Union (RU), radical groupings that had gone from the fragmentation of the SDS to the discovery of the working class, had sent organizers into the works. Their appearance brought about a surge in the working unity of the Black and Latin workers who wanted to limit the influence of these groups which had their base outside the factory complex. An acceleration of the leaflet campaign was a strong indication of this closing of the ranks.

Information for the leaflets was acquired through a network of secret call numbers printed on the back of each leaflet. These numbers were changed weekly in order to prevent both the union and the company from pinpointing their source in the respective departments.

Crouch and the rest of the union leadership received their share of barbs through the medium of the leaflet mill as well. While the majority of the leaflets focused their attention on the misdeeds of the more infamous foremen and the unsafe working conditions in particular departments, the heavy-handed and broadly undemocratic procedures of the local union officials in conducting the everyday business of the local were also publicized.

In the fiberglass and insulation departments of plant no. 2, a quorum of Black workers at a hastily convened union meeting, managed to defeat a bid by the union leadership to increase their salaries. A leaflet circulated shortly afterwards clearly indicated that the targets of this wave of plant insurgency were not merely the line foremen and time keepers, but also an increasingly moribund union leadership:

Ernie Suarez, the union's Vice President, came to the union meeting wearing a black silk suit, a black shirt and a grey tie. He was ready for that money. When the union members voted down his \$25 raise, he turned a dark red. Jim Brankshaw, the treasurer, got so fed up with Ernie's greed that he called him a money-hungry Mexican. Ernie couldn't handle it, and went after him with a bottle. This goes to show you that the leaders of our local are fighting over our labor and union dues. *They are violating their own rules.*

After seven months of internal departmental leafleting — from September 1971 to May 1972 — the first plant-wide leaflet was circulated with the aid of the heretofore unknown Chicago-based League of Revolutionary Black Workers. While the previous departmental leaflets had worn down the morale of the line foremen and the lower levels of management in key departments, the new form of leafleting drew the attention of the factory's general management and threw panic into the ranks of Local 571's leadership.

Initially the union and management dismissed the new kind of leaflets as the work of "outsiders" and "reds." When the leaflets persisted in giving detailed information about working conditions in numerous departments over the entire complex, both Local 571 and the company were propelled toward a more decisive course of action. Their new battle strategy included: harassment of workers suspected of being members of the League, the transfer and rotation of the personnel of entire production lines to different departments, political firings, and stepped-up surveillance of Black workers by the Cicero police.

The workers responded to the twin campaigns of the local and the company with a new offensive, exposing the harassment in subsequent leaflets and instigating work slow-downs to several departments at once. Cured of their initial reticence and apprehension, an ever increasing number of Black and Latin workers in the central plants began to pursue their grievances beyond first step arbitration, depending upon support from the leaflets for their actions.

A portion of a leaflet on one of several policy grievances that were filed out of plant no. 8 gives a clear picture of the way the workers' grievances on the shop floor had become focused on the union administration:

At the third step of a grievance the union has the power to arbitrate or strike. These are the two weapons the union has. In Lordstown, Ohio at the General Motors Vega plant, the rate of cars was increased to over 110 cars an hour. The workers went on strike and the UAW had no choice but to go along. For the first time since the great wildcat CIO strikes of the 30's through the 50's a strike has been called over working conditions. Local 571 did not ask its members what decisions they wanted to make in terms of the situation in plant no. 8. They just talked about getting somebody in Washington. Hell, we got somebody in Chicago: a new body of representatives is what we need.

The changing outlook of the production workers was not limited in its impact to fostering paranoia among key line and plant foremen. Union stewards, too, were shocked out of their docility, and this reaction was to have important implications for the upcoming elections in the local. Certain factions within the union leadership and members of the stewards committees welcomed the appearance of the League's leaflets. These insiders were eventually to abandon the prospective slate of officers that Crouch was trying to put together. Among the Mexican-American workers this defection was especially important because they had generally been willing to go along with the leadership as long as one of their number held a top office. Once the Mexican-American workers saw their own men within the local structure become hesitant about Crouch's reelection, they became open to new styles of trade union organization and leadership.

Puerto Ricans, being newer in the plant work force and located in jobs similar to the Black workers, had been more eager to unite with the militant Black forces. The

advent of some Mexican-American workers to this grouping made possible a firming up and formalization of the Black and Latin Caucus in the middle of 1972. It was now possible to shape a strategy for the election of officers in Local 571 that was coming up in 1974.

After the flagrant abuses of power by foremen and union officials, the issue that most inflamed the Black and Spanish people on the production lines was the stepped up implementation of the Motion Time Study schemes. At the heart of this issue was the workers' quest for control over their work lives — a struggle for dignity in shaping the character of the labor power that they put into production. The contest over this question is a most crucial one and has survived the local elections of May, 1974.

Going into the union elections the Black and Latin Caucus picked up more strength, enabling them to act as the core of a still broader slate. Roger Earskins, who had earlier been interim President of the Local, joined up and was placed at the head of their ticket. Some whites who had previously played key roles in the union left Crouch and were slated for various offices. The incumbent camp broke in two as Ernie Suarez, the highest ranking Mexican-American officer, also went up against Crouch in a three-way race. With 1,000 ballots being cast in the elections, the Black and Latin Coalition-organized slate carried a plurality with 100 vote lead over the closest competitor.

Formal union procedures inadequate

The fight for a more humanely oriented form of work control has centered itself among the workers of building no. 59 on the old and new outer case lines. Here the key operations in the completion of refrigerators, stoves and air conditioners are made. While overall work in the tubing and insulations departments located in other plant buildings is probably more hazardous regarding health and safety, the extreme pressure from the Motion Times Study staff has made building 59 the focal point of incipient conflict.

Downtime — the period when the last parts are taken off the line and the machinery shut off — is the most significant moment in the entire Motion Time Study process. At this stage the assembly line worker receives the largest share of penalties for faulty pieces and, thus, a reduction in his pay rate. Throughout each phase of the Black and Latin Coalition the most consistent demand of its members has been for a clearcut, fair way to compute downtime. There has been little success in meeting this issue. Systematic reduction of downtime from 90 minutes in 1971 to 22 minutes in 1974-75 represents the single most explosive local issue covered by the current Hotpoint contract. Its resolution in some form that is agreeable to the majority of production workers will determine the length and effectiveness of the present union leadership.

After a whirlwind entry into office the new union leadership at Hotpoint now finds itself at a crucial fork in the road. President Earskins has strengthened the local's position in bargaining for wages and benefits in the upcoming national General Electric negotiations. He is presently head of the council of Sheet Metal Workers locals from the midwest which participates in the inter-union bargaining coalition. However, Local 571's officers still have not moved on the most immediate demands that surfaced in the last election: immediate upgrading of Black and Latin workers with the most seniority, a larger number of educational programs for shop stewards, and a

drive for an all union shop. Many of the stewards feel cut off and unable to communicate with the top officers regarding working conditions.

Pressed by the gnawing issue of increased layoffs (600 as of January, 1974) and the potential resurgence of shop stewards committees, the current leadership has ducked a major campaign against speedup through time and motion studies. All the factors involved in Motion Time Study, and more particularly, downtime are not economic. Non-economic dimensions of MTS regarding control over life on the job go right to the heart of the internal politics at Local 571. The challenge posed by Hotpoint's time and motion campaign can potentially provide the preconditions for a new unity between a more mature Black and Latin Coalition and the pivotal shop stewards committees. Without that unity Local 571 could come out gravely weakened in the upcoming negotiations with General Electric-Hotpoint.

The antagonism that has arisen at Hotpoint as regards the control over the pace and character of the production process is far from being an isolated local issue. In many places throughout the country, though, it remains a latent issue. The general public and most workers have been conditioned to think of labor-management relations only in terms of formalized procedures — contract negotia-

tions, influencing legislation, and even the grievance settlement mechanisms. Still, in day to day informal ways there is a constant contest in the work process as to who does what, and under what circumstances. It is within these ongoing, informal relationships that Blacks and Latins often experience the sharpest impact of racism at work. In these circumstances racial consciousness and pride can act to facilitate workers coming together to counteract manipulation and exploitation.

Many unions try to retreat into operating only in terms of formal procedures, some even virtually ignoring grievances that are filed. Leadership in these unions face the threat of their membership thrusting the issues of the work process upon the organization. Sometimes this will occur within the mechanisms of the union itself with the aggressive filing of grievances and electoral challenges to the incumbent officers. Other times the workers feeling hamstrung within the union, organize immediately at the workplace with slowdowns, leaflets and even wildcat strikes. The organization of economic life into giant productive units creates the potentiality for a sense of association and common action other than that specified by the imperatives of corporate managers. Possibilities for these common actions are more varied and far richer than what is spelled out in any trade union contract or in the labor-management section of the Federal Code.

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
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OCCUPATION

A Challenge to Labor: Sadlowski and the Steel Workers

by David Moberg

David Moberg, a former Newsweek correspondent, is currently working on a book on the strike by the young auto workers at Lordstown, Ohio.



Daniel Pearlmutter

Starting in the early fall days of 1972, the ordinary workday routine of members of the United Steel Workers union around Chicago was periodically interrupted by a strange phenomenon. Waiting in the plant locker rooms after work or standing at the factory gates at 5 a.m. was a worker, or maybe two, from some other plant. He would come up, introduce himself, and say he was working for Ed Sadlowski and they wanted to change the union, give the worker a voice, make sure there was a choice.

Ed who? Change the union? Who had ever heard of much of a choice in this region of the United Steel Workers, especially at the level of district director? Joe Germano was appointed director of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee for the South Chicago and Gary, Indiana, complex of steel mills and metal fabricating factories in 1940. It had been 26 years since anyone had even challenged Germano for the office. True, the director was stepping down, but his long-time assistant Sam Evett was the announced heir apparent to the post.

Most workers, if they even cared whether the usually remote union had a director or simply left the office vacant, were skeptical about these visitors and their Polish candidate. If they weren't just another bunch of careerists on the make, they were probably impractical idealists wasting their time. In a region famous for its tight, corrupt, and efficient city political machines, Germano was known as the Mayor Daley of the steel workers, not simply because of the long close ties between the two men and their machines. Germano had won his first election by manipulation of the balloting, and his steely grip on the union bureaucracy had permitted him to control the district with ease.

But a few people would stop to listen and take a leaflet. Maybe they had been the long-time local opposition; maybe they were the kind of tenacious shop floor fighter who never believes in caving in to the boss; maybe they were men or women who had felt discontented but never were sure what to do about it. The talk from the Sadlowski supporter brought out that sense of disgruntled powerlessness and resentment about bad working conditions — from pay to safety to harassment to benefits — and a union which was slow at best, unresponsive generally and largely corrupted into complacency and arrogance. Since many workers never saw anyone from the international union and would even go on strike without seeing a representative, talking to a spokesperson of a candidate for high office was an unusual opportunity. The talk flowed freely, often in homes or bars after work. Because the campaigners were factory workers themselves and members of the same union, there was a special sense of identification, the stirrings of a class awareness which the simple act of talking together helped to bring out. Ed Sadlowski was a steel worker, too, they were told, unlike the long-time official Evett. Perhaps, for once, the workers would be represented in the union.

Such personal contacts repeated hundreds and hundreds of times, backed up with massive leafletting at plant gates, were the secret of Ed Sadlowski's successful defeat of Sam Evett in 1974, following the invalidation of an

earlier election because of vote fraud by Evett backers. The solid superstructure of the important 1.4 million-member international union was threatened by this revolt in its largest district, with between 110,000 and 130,000 members. The growing accommodation of the union to the large corporations and the neglect of workers in small shops were also challenged.

What does Sadlowski represent

But was it a successful revolt? Can electing one man make any difference? Can the potential threat be contained? Or is the Sadlowski victory a sign of real change and a means for further change in the lives, thinking and action of a vital part of the American working class?

Sادلowski was only 34 when he announced he was running for district director in July 1972, but he already had behind him an impressive career. Starting while still a teenager as a laborer in the mills, where his father worked for several decades and his grandfather had briefly put in time, Sadlowski was elected a grievance committeeman at age 23. Three years later he led an insurgent ticket to victory and served as president of his local 65 for two terms, at the giant U.S. Steel South Works in south Chicago. In 1968, Germano tapped him for a staff job. That appointment made many of his supporters feel more distant from, more skeptical about Ed Sadlowski. Few people received such posts without serious compromises being exacted at some point. Ironically, it was the broader experience, the more numerous contacts and the greater maneuverability of the staff position which helped Sadlowski mount his later campaign in the image of the candidate from the "rank and file" — a phrase he personally dislikes.

There was a big "CIO" sign which Eddie Sadlowski could see from his bedroom window as he grew up in the mill community of South Chicago. Maybe it was the constant reminder of that great labor upsurge, or the stories from his father who started in the mills just before the Republic Steel massacre, or some kind of almost mystical experience that Ed Sadlowski, even today, likes to speculate about over a beer and a shot that led him to want to identify his life with the militant workers' struggles during the 1930's.

That concrete identification with workers, steel workers especially, and with a surviving, if suppressed, tradition of real battles and real victories is a key to the success of Ed Sadlowski as a home-grown working-class leader. Friendships and community ties from his childhood carried over into the mills, and the ties there linked South Works to Gary Works to Inland, and the Bush to the East Side to Gary. A tradition of activism and opposition survived through a network of friends, acquaintances, pals.

Sادلowski's knowledge — from books as well as recollections by old-timers — of the early union organizing must have influenced his style as he began to work in the union. Clearly ambitious from the beginning, he eschewed the normal route of a careerist, currying favor with upper-level officials. He was going to buck the machine. "The

only way you can be effective," he said after a long day's work running from plant to plant, "is to have horses — people. If you haven't got 'em, go home. You can be eloquent and on the right side of the ledger and you lose."

The first election his group contested in the local showed the pattern for later victories. At the local meeting before the election, "we brought 300 guys, they had 200. We elect our nine tellers (to count votes). Now it's our guys. Oh, my god, that was a whole revelation. Now if I'm going to play a game with you, first I want to know the rules. We became astute students of that constitution. For 2 to 3 years we had arguments in the shanties in the mills — cussing, yelling, howling — but learning, learning, learning. There wasn't nobody teaching, just rapping. By the time we put it together we knew the rules. No argument." They followed the rules, won, then brought in outside observers to keep everything honest rather than take advantage of their power to cheat like many predecessors.

He organized a caucus like he would organize a union. The same tactics led to the successful campaign for district director. Pals — "the best thing out of the [district director] election was we made a lot of real pals," Sadlowski said later — got together, dissatisfied with their unresponsive union. This time the fighting would be against both the company and an established union, backed surreptitiously by management in certain small ways. Yet, there was a union and there were traditions and expectations of union members which could form the basis of a movement for renewal.

The first and biggest problem facing Ed Sadlowski was simply getting on the ballot. "Discontent builds up over 30 years," said Clem Balanoff, a leading organizer for Sadlowski and long-time steel worker. "It gets hot. There was discontent there, but you couldn't get on the ballot." Black activist Jimmy Lyons recalled how "the old-timers, who were very familiar with the problem, said, 'If he can get on the ballot, he's got to win.' But they thought it couldn't be done." The problems of getting nominated illustrate dramatically the ways in which the Germano machine had maintained control over the union. On the surface it seemed simple: 18 locals were needed to nominate a candidate and there were 350 locals in the district. "You may think it sounds easy to get 18 nominations out of 350 locals," said burly, hard-working John Askins, "but it took us 25 years."

Gaining trust among the rank-and-file

At the start, Sadlowski had to put together a crew of supporters. Although he had backers from his own local, that clearly wasn't enough. In his four years on the staff he had met union activists from many more plants, including the wide range of machine shops, can factories, warehouses, utilities and other workplaces represented by the USW. He also discovered their problems, which were frequently much different from the 10,000-member basic steel locals. Pay, benefits, working conditions, speed-up, and virtually every other standard contract item were worse in the smaller shops. Also, staff representation was almost nonexistent in some cases, making a mockery of the already inadequate grievance procedure. However, in most small locals, the international staff man did maintain very strict control over the local union, pacifying the local officers with "a beer and a shot," a steak dinner or maybe a junket to some convention, while running local affairs and even local meetings directly. By doing a good job servicing locals assigned to him as a staff man and

letting the membership vote on their contracts, Ed picked up new, wider support.

Any rank-and-file activist with principles trusted the staff men only slightly more than the plant manager. When Sadlowski first approached John Askins, later one of his most dedicated supporters, Askins said he wasn't even interested in talking to a staff man. Even now Askins, who still works from early morning to late at night for Sadlowski, says he is ready to start organizing against Brother Ed if he shows the slightest sign of selling out. "I remember when Eddie was going on staff," recounted Jim Balanoff, a leader of the opposition to Germano in the big Inland Steel local. "I didn't like that. He was a friend, but I figured he'd sell out." Sadlowski managed to convince the skeptics that he was not out to butter his own bread but to rebuild a union. The campaign workers he pulled together in the first few months were, in Jim Balanoff's words, "rank-and-file guys, people who were on the 'out' in their own locals, radicals, conservatives — all welded together to get a better union. They're all good union guys. They all want a democratic union." Unlike most campaign workers in union elections, there is no evidence Sadlowski's workers were hoping to coast into a cushy office with the victory of their man.

Oddly, one of the first problems was simply finding out where the locals were. The big steel plants in South Chicago and Gary were easy. There were already contacts inside, since most had long traditions of opposition caucuses which held office from time to time. But the little "bucket shops" spread throughout northern Illinois and Indiana were another story. Not only were they usually under the thumb of their staff representative, they were isolated and unknown to other union members and locals. Also, recently District 50 of the United Mine Workers had joined the Steel Workers. The Sadlowski backers didn't know where virtually any of those plants were located. Naturally the Germano staff refused to supply the information, but one disgruntled, retiring staff man secretly helped out by turning over a list of factories and local unions.

All but one of the staff representatives, Ray O'Malley, who had briefly opposed Germano's election in 1964, and nearly all the local union officials in the district backed Evett. The machine was confident to the point of being cocky that Sadlowski would not even make it on the ballot. The insurgents decided they would aim for 40 nominations. They got exactly that, although not necessarily from the places they expected.

As the campaign grew more intense, the campaign tactics revealed some of the differences between the candidates. Staff representatives and local union officers often threatened workers who leaned to Sadlowski and used high-handed pressure tactics which provoked anger, inquisitiveness about the campaigns, and rebellion against the union establishment. Evett was able to talk in local meetings far more easily than Sadlowski, and often campaigned in plants from which Sadlowski was barred by company police from even distributing handbills.

Hard, relentless work

The organization Sadlowski built was effective but informal. "There was no laid-out plan," Chicano independent political leader and union officer John Chico said. "We met the obstacles on a day-to-day basis. Just organize people. Play it by ear." A core of 25 to 30 people worked day after day, using their vacation time and holidays to campaign, getting up at 5 a.m. every morning and staying on the case until late shift changes in the middle of the night. Another 50 or 60, by the latter part of the

campaign, would work a couple of times a week. Mainly the work, according to heavy-set Ted Jordan, a 16-year veteran of U.S. Steel's South Works, was "leg work, plant gates. Every morning before work, at night after work, during vacations. Plant gates, nothing but plant gates. It got so they all looked alike. I never knew how many plants there were." There would have been no chance of victory without relentless, hard, routine, slogging work.

It also made a difference who did the work. The fact that nearly all the campaigners were workers from USW shops greatly legitimized the campaign as a rank-and-file effort. It also permitted that direct worker-to-worker communication among different plants which was tinder for rank-and-file rebellion, class awareness, and determined opposition to hard-nosed bosses and corrupt union bureaucrats alike. Sadlowski campaigners, who had been inspired by the success of Miners for Democracy and Arnold Miller in the United Mine Workers Union, chose to avoid Miller's reliance on large numbers of student supporters.

"We had very few sophistications," Ed Sadlowski explained later in a bar a few blocks from a South Chicago mill. "That's what made us so good. But don't kid yourself about structural defects. Some guy said we were fucked up and chaotic like the Chinese Army. Another guy said, 'They didn't do so bad.'" Whatever the condition of the Chinese army, Sadlowski's troops were clearly pulled together informally and guided by personal zeal and self-discipline. Most were experienced in union politics. A rough consensus of opinion existed on the very general issues of the election, since a style of action and an overall approach was promoted more than specific programs and platforms. Sadlowski brushes off implied criticism of the loose organization by asking why everyone has to be "capitalist," with a clear division of labor, hierarchy and formal procedures. There was in his campaign group, he emphasized, a sense of responsibility for getting the work done but there was also a free give-and-take style which made most union members feel at home. "Ted Smolarek would pull out pieces of paper from his back pocket with lists of plants," Sadlowski said, describing the informality. "At our meetings it would be 'fuck you' and 'hey, what's happening,' not 'sub-district one reporting.'"

Democracy in the union

From the beginning, the main issue Sadlowski raised was democracy in the union. The rank-and-file should decide on political endorsements as well as contracts. He advocated Black, Latino and women representatives on the staff and union executive board. He also attacked harsh discipline, loss of jobs, the decline in pay of steel workers compared with auto workers and coal miners, unhealthy and dangerous working conditions, and the "false ballyhoo of productivity" (in reference to the Abel-negotiated union-management productivity committees). He stressed the special needs and continuing neglect of the small plants and proposed district conferences of locals from related industries (such as warehouses, can makers, steel, foundry and others).

There were other less direct but equally important issues, some of which were symbolic yet important. "Elect Sadlowski — Elect a Steel Worker," the campaign literature trumpeted, playing on Evett's lack of experience working in the mills. In some ways a vague and insubstantial appeal, it was also an effort to establish a working class identification. Sadlowski's youth was important in many plant gate and locker room raps, although it is significant that most of the hard-core Sadlowski workers

were men (and occasionally women) with 15 or 20 years seniority and older than their candidate. The Polish name helped in some areas, and so did the generally favorable local press reports. But the basic appeal was rank-and-file decision-making: "Your Clear Choice" or "It's Ours to Change (Este Es Nuestro Cambio)" headed typical leaflets.

Some critics felt Sadlowski failed to raise certain issues strongly, especially in the later phases of his campaign. Although he opposed the experimental negotiating agreement in basic steel which surrendered the right to strike, it was not explicitly a major focus. Much later the union-management consent decree, which represented a restricted, ineffective compromise settlement to redress the long history of racial and sex discrimination in steel plants, could have become more of an issue, but it was almost never discussed. Although supporters argued continually over what issues to raise, there was clearly a strong tilt towards picking the safest issues to ensure victory. Some issues were rejected as too limited to one sector of the district. "You can't create issues," all-around organizer Clem Balanoff said. "Issues are there. You're a megaphone . . . You gear a campaign on issues that bother the constituency as a whole."

One result of such an emphasis on the constituency as a whole was the relative de-emphasis of special appeals to blacks or Latinos, who respectively make up probably 35 per cent and 10 per cent of the district. (A *Chicago Reporter* study estimated overall "minority" membership in the Chicago metropolitan region at 45 per cent. Although many small foundries and other factories are all black, even the basic steel locals are usually around 40 per cent black.) Black and Chicano workers were active in the campaign, and featured prominently in endorsement literature. Estimates from different organizers suggest Blacks and Latinos probably favored Sadlowski more strongly than white workers, but not by any overwhelming margin. Rumors that Sadlowski, the Pole, was a racist circulated in the mills. One young Black worker reportedly refused some leaflets from a Sadlowski supporter until he heard his local president denounce Sadlowski as a "nigger-lover." "Give me a handful of those leaflets," he suddenly told the campaigner, in an abrupt switch.

On the whole, the tensions over race were downplayed. Black activists assumed, with some justification, that Sadlowski would be likely to promote minority staff representatives, but it was never an explicit pledge. Sadlowski has been critical of the consent decree as inadequate, but tends to stress the need for a complete revamping of the classification system for lines of seniority rather than an appeal for reparations to Black workers. "You can't be racist and be socially conscious or a good trade unionist," Sadlowski repeats over and over in conversations. Although his campaign ultimately was buoyed by the hopes of Black and Latino workers that a more democratic, militant, open union would benefit them, the problems of racial antagonism within the ranks — especially over seniority and promotions — were only avoided during the election, not overcome.

The system fights back

As the February 13, 1973, elections approached, Sadlowski forces were confident but pushing hard, counting on a large turnout of as many as 45 per cent of eligible voters to overcome the machine loyalists. As the votes were tallied the race seemed close with Sadlowski leading. Then early in the morning at some of the big locals, the votes were no longer being announced. Three days later Evett claimed victory by a margin of 23,394 to 21,606.

The overall number of voters was lower than Sadlowski backers predicted. The Sadlowski steel workers, inspired by the coal miners' success, countered with charges of fraud. The union had refused to give them lists of locals and voting times. In many cases the challengers did not have observers, or were not permitted to oversee all ballot boxes. Shortly afterwards the USW international invalidated results at Local 1014, a big Gary steel local. Although Evett took office, and Sadlowski remained on the staff, the insurgents continued their attack, hiring Chicago independent alderman Leon Despres and attorney Joseph Rauh, who had worked for Miners For Democracy, to fight the election results in court under Landrum-Griffin law provisions. Sadlowski charged irregularities in 147 locals, and the Labor Department ordered a new election following its investigation. The union trial board of steel local 1066 found its seven tellers, including a man serving as staff representative, guilty of vote forgery and barred them from holding union office. The fraud was blatant and massive in many places, but Evett maintained a new election was unwarranted.

The international union freed a top official to help Evett keep his seat in the new election scheduled for November 1974. And money poured in from staff men all over the country organized as Steelworkers for Continued Leadership. It had poured \$90,000 into union elections in 1973, drawing on donations of \$500 each from district directors and \$50 each from staff members, as suggested in a letter from the USW secretary-treasurer. "... Pretty much from the beginning of the election of officers of this union," Steel Workers President I.W. Abel admitted in court, "the official family pretty much supports each other..."

While Sadlowski hammered away at vote corruption, "official family" tyranny, and a dues increase supported by Sam Evett (who benefitted from a recent 40 per cent salary-hike), Evett's backers accused Sadlowski of being supported by "Marxist-Leninists," "outsiders" and suburban millionaires. The "outsider" charge particularly stung the 20-year steel workers standing at the gates with leaflets. Although some money did come from supporters outside the union, it appears the vast bulk of funds came from contributions, often of \$100 to \$200 from steel workers themselves. Some Sadlowski backers were socialists or leftists, but there was no organized presence of any left group in the campaign.

Over 300 Labor Department agents monitored the 1973 election. The increased voter turnout plus the surveillance gave Sadlowski the victory he was sure he had already won once before - this time by 39,637 to 20,058, or a two-to-one margin.

Winning the election, it turned out, was just another step in the battle. Sadlowski found many of the office files missing when he moved in. Although the number of staff representatives has dropped from 60 to 43, Sadlowski's appointments to those positions have been blocked by I.W. Abel, who has the ultimate power to appoint. When Sadlowski tried to transfer representatives within the district, Abel blocked the moves. Although as director he has been able to pressure staff representatives, most are still loyal to the "official family" and are not necessarily cooperative. Sadlowski, a vocal but solitary critic on the international executive board, is often excluded from meetings or denied information. The USW has tried to restrict his influence, for example, blocking broadcast of a Studs Terkel interview with Sadlowski over Pittsburgh television.

Pressures on Sadlowski during his first year in office were exacerbated by the recessionary slump in the steel industry. At one point in 1975 over 20 percent of the

district's membership was laid off, and half of the remainder were on short weeks.

In the fight against the centralized power of the union officialdom, Sadlowski is now caught in a tough spot. As director of the largest district in the steelworkers, he should have power to change things. But his staff is not his own, and they know it. Some are already preparing to challenge him in the next election in 1977. Ultimately, Sadlowski argues there must be structural changes in the union to prevent the concentration of power that now exists. The pressure for such structural shifts will have to continue to come from the members. In the meantime, Sadlowski has two alternative routes to achieve the power formally won but effectively denied to him as director. He could expand rank-and-file organization and encourage local initiative to bypass the international union, or he could continue the drive for organizational power by contending for the international presidency. Clearly, he cannot stand still and expect to last. It appears that he is, tentatively, trying to pursue some of each alternative course of action.

The future of reform

The Sadlowski forces, now called Steelworkers Fight Back, have not disbanded, as happens so often with groups supporting insurgent candidates. Partly they continue their work to make the nationwide contacts Sadlowski will need for the fairly likely but unannounced campaign he will mount for president of the union when Abel has to step down in 1977. Several of his experienced campaigners are now travelling actively across the country in an effort to put together a national network of dissidents, opposition caucuses, and independents in the same way they built their district election movement. Although plans for calling a special Dues Convention have been dropped, insurgent forces from around the country will undoubtedly raise issue of democracy and reform at the regular fall 1976 union convention.

Many of the Sadlowski supporters in the district are now running for office in their locals in elections to be held this spring. Although Steelworkers Fight Back does not attempt to control such efforts, the ties formed and continuing conversations give support to the local campaigns. Steelworkers Fight Back is like an unofficial staff for Sadlowski, who spends a large part of his typical 16-hour work days running from one plant to another, doing the work his staff might be doing if he had his own staff, encouraging local militants, and giving advice on how to handle local union politics as well as conflicts with employers. The failure to effectively take over the district office has forced Sadlowski and his supporters to depend even more strongly on continued insurgency from the ranks. Yet, it has also meant that the issue of the national elections has been forced on them immediately, since a failure to change the national leadership would greatly hamstring any real rejuvenation of the union in District 31. Steelworkers Fight Back plays a number of important roles: local district organizing, unofficial staff, national rank-and-file organizing, a Sadlowski campaign organization (for whatever office he chooses), and educational forum (holding regular meetings on labor history and related topics and soon to produce the first post-election issue of an irregular rank-and-file newspaper for the district). Sadlowski is still the main voice, but not the only one, and the raggle-taggle, volunteer army image remains true today.

Can such a group lead a long march to union democracy, rank-and-file activity and intensified class struggle in

steel and related industries? In his term in office, Sadlowski has shown strong support for militant moves by other workers, including Chicago teachers and the residents and interns at Cook County hospital. He has lobbied politically in the state legislature, despite losing the contest for control of the USW political arm (two other much smaller districts outvote District 31). He has attacked U.S. Steel for failure to absorb the costs of pollution control and threatening to lay off workers if environmental standards were maintained. But mainly he has been devoted to changing the steel workers union, stimulating rank-and-file aggressiveness and pushing the staff representatives to respond. His understanding of how the steel workers union bureaucracy has become corrupted into complacency gives a good idea of how he may act, given the chance, to change the union.

"Too mechanical, too phony"

"A lot of guys [on the staff] get almost indignant when the guys [in the shops] want them to do something," he commented as we drove through the Gary mill area. There are good guys on this staff. Don't get me wrong. You take the most aggressive guy in the world and put him in that environment and his aggressiveness shrinks and sooner or later it just becomes unconscious. It's almost like an elitist attitude. They think they know what's best. It's an easy trap to fall into. You've got to have a sense of what you're doing. It's not a good guy-bad guy. The standard answer given is, 'It's not in the agreement.' A lot of guys become technocrats, mechanical. You see people fall into that, not even knowing what they're doing, and once a guy gets in, it's hard to get out. That superiority attitude goes with it: you know the contract, can figure the 2¢ benefit. It's hard to convince a guy it's not the right way, to get him to admit he's been wrong."

Sadlowski hopped out of the car to pump his own gas, then continued his thoughts on the mystique of the official and his presumed — sometimes real — power. "I have a problem with that," he said. "It's a lot of bullshit." Then he referred back to our early morning visit to a municipal water works where the women workers were returning after a couple of years lost work when they were fired for not crossing the men's picket lines. "For example, the Gary-Hobart water works. You saw all the guys lining up. The only guys that should have been there were (the staff man and the local president) and the women, the women. That's where the emphasis should have been. You know whose names are going to be in the paper? Mine. They should have put the women's names in. I have a problem with that mystique. It's bullshit. The sooner people realize it, the better we'll all be. I have a problem with that. A belly problem. It's more distorted history. That's the goofiness, my friend. I haven't used it. I find it almost distasteful. This was a rare exception. Do away with that bullshit, the phoniness. People can see the real and unreal. I never campaigned at a plant that was on strike. It was a standing rule. These guys are fighting for their economic livelihood, not to elect some goddamn director. If we were going over to their strike, it would have been to support their economic demands."

Sadlowski realizes that fighting corruption isn't simply a matter of keeping members' dues out of officers' bank accounts. There are political consequences. "The most autonomous locals have the best men, the most stand-up guys," he said, "and they negotiate the best contracts. Those are guys you could form real alliances with. If a guy can buy your vote, then he doesn't have to deliver at the bargaining table." But corruption isn't a personal affair, but institutional, he insisted.

Much as he fights the international and I.W. Abel, Sadlowski still says, "I like all of them better than any banker I've ever met. If it came right down to it, Abel would be in our trench." He is willing to believe that Abel and other union bureaucrats he opposes are truly trying to make the union work "and relate more to that movement than to the company." But he has no sympathies with Abel's policies, which are especially destructive to the labor movement because they come from the mouth of a union leader. "He really believes that shit," Sadlowski exclaimed. "That's what fucks my mind up. I can deal with the guy who's the boss, the property protector. But he's the labor leader. It messes you up inside. That type does more harm than all of the Chambers of Commercies."

The people who will make a difference in the union, whether Ed Sadlowski is elected president or not, are the people who made the difference in his campaign. "The key to real change is what lies behind the whole union, changing that institutional attitude. It's a deeper thing. People ask how can you motivate it politically, but that's way down the road. Isn't it enough that people should want to belong to something that means more than tickets and steak dinners? The people that made it work this time are basically people who never got entrapped [by institutionalized elitism and corruption] or caught themselves real fast."

A man wants a goddamn voice

What was most important about your campaign? I asked. "A man wanting a goddamn voice in his own environment in which he works," he said. "The guy feels frustrated in the political arena in this country, in the social arena, in the economic arena and in the labor movement. What does man relate to most — outside of his family? His work. That's tragic, but he doesn't feel he belongs to the company. You know what capitalism has done. It's created its own demise, like feudalism. As much as it has tried to fool the public — 'pull up by your bootstraps' — too many people don't believe that bullshit. When you don't see your reward at work, you get pissed. When you get laid off, you get pissed. When you get used like a tool for profits, you get pissed. How long do you think the managers can hold out? I see a big crack up the center, more and more every day. People want to believe it [the myths of American capitalism], but they're testing themselves to do it, and they're wrestling. Total disbelief: it would be an error if I suggested that. Their want to believe is too great. The thing that I'm concerned with is which way that pendulum swings. What do you replace it with? It's not an automatic swing to the left. But the direction ain't ready yet. I want a more socially responsible economy. It doesn't have to have a label. I think you got to start talking about humanism."


From his experiences Sadlowski sees a decade ahead of political upheaval by workers in the United States and Europe, involving coalitions of the productive workers — by which he means farmers and housewives as well as wage-earning workers — challenging the economic priorities of their countries.

Having just celebrated his first year in office, Sadlowski can't point to such drastic changes having occurred so far. But he says there has been a great upsurge in strikes in the district. Also, he feels there is "more of an awareness, a political awareness." Other steel workers feel their staff representatives are a little faster in helping out locals on problems. Certainly, there has been a new wave of local union contests for next spring's elections. At the district conference last June, commented Danley manufac-

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Two Women's Organizations:

Women Employed and the Chic



DANIEL
PARLANTIER

Chicago Women's Liberation Union

by Deborah Dobbin

Deborah Dobbin has been active in the women's movement for a number of years. She has worked with both Women Employed and Chicago Women's Liberation Union.

As more and more women were moved by the ideas of women's liberation in the late 1960's, they began to express this vision in a variety of organizational forms. Groups were differentiated not only by their goals but also by programs and structures. Perhaps the most crucial difference at that time was between the goals of those groups which were mainly interested in providing more opportunities and alternatives for women within the existing social framework, and the more radical part of the movement which linked women's liberation with the need for a socialist society. Programmatic differences were less clearly defined: much of the early energy of the whole movement, for example, went into consciousness raising. As programs were developed, however, they began to reflect political differences. Women concerned with rebuilding society started to work on alternatives to existing institutions: day care centers, schools for women, newspapers and magazines, abortion clinics. On the other hand, women who were involved in making changes within their social environment concentrated on surveying different facets of sexism; in advertising, for example, or in the teaching of history, literature or psychology, or in employment or credit practices.

Organization building

The question of structure was more of an issue for women who saw themselves as radical than for the movement as a whole. It was particularly important to women who believed that the process of change itself was crucial in determining the kind of change that took place. Many women rejected all explicit structures, seeing them as traditionally and inherently oppressive. Others wanted to build organizations with formal structure, accountable leadership and democratic decision-making process. They saw a need for organizations to provide a place where women could find and join women's liberation, a focus for linking different activities, a forum in which to develop ideology, and a center for the energy which had been generated. They also felt that without a formal structure, an informal one would develop; that elitism and

oppressive hierarchical forms could not be eliminated without specific and considered alternative models.

Organization building has been one of the central issues in the women's movement in Chicago over the last six or seven years. Almost alone in the radical sector of the movement, Chicago women seemed to realize the need for organization very early. While energy in other parts of the country was centered on rap groups or building alternatives, Chicago women were involved in a struggle to develop a city-wide membership organization. The Chicago Women's Liberation Union was the product of that struggle. Established in 1969 largely by white, middle-class activists with considerable experience in the protest movements of the decade, the Union represented an attempt to build a mass multi-class and multi-issue women's liberation organization which would link personal transformation with social transformation. It is now the only local organization from the 1960's that remains a force in the movement — an achievement in itself. It is still struggling for survival, for a way to link structure and politics, and for a way to integrate and to build from different political tendencies within the women's movement.

The Union gave Chicago women a context and a forum for discussion shared by few other women in the early years of the radical movement. Consequently, issues which sometimes split local movements in other parts of the country, were less divisive here. Questions of structure/anti-structure, left/feminist, or gay/straight created enormous struggle but *within* an organization. In Chicago, the split came later and characteristically came not over the need for organization but over the *kind* of organization to be built — not without a long and hard political struggle within the Union after which a number of women left. Those who departed were interested in building certain kinds of direct action programs and organizations which they saw as necessary to serve those campaigns. Women Employed (WE) is one of those structures. It is a later product of the same momentum which established the Union. While its focus is narrower, concentrating on the single issue of job discrimination, in terms of its goals, the organization is highly successful. After

two and a half years of existence, it has a membership of several hundred working women and an impressive series of successes in using confrontational tactics against employers who have failed to comply with anti-discrimination laws.

In spite of a number of attempts, the Union has failed to develop successful struggle programs using the strategy so well demonstrated by Women Employed. Other programs, directed more towards service or education, have been much more successful. Current and thriving activities include: the Liberation School which offers about ten courses each term, primarily in skills and introductory women's studies, reaching anywhere from 50 to 100 women; the Legal Clinic in which women lawyers and law students offer counselling and referrals to women on any legal problem; and the Health Evaluation and Referral Service, a telephone service with information on women's health facilities, particularly abortion clinics.

Other workgroups are more concerned with a particular constituency of women. The Prison Project, for example, is involved in direct work with women in prison at Dwight Correctional Institute in Dwight, Illinois, and WIND Work Release Center in Chicago, as well as outside support work and community political education. Similarly, the Lesbian Workgroup sponsors and supports a number of activities in the lesbian community, including publishing a bi-monthly newsletter, offering classes in the Liberation School on: "The Lesbian Experience," and coordinating a lesbian basketball team. With these and other work projects, plus a number of chapters with no specific program, the Union has a membership of 200 to 300 women of whom perhaps half are actively involved.

Making programs fit ideology

When the organization began, programs were established somewhat haphazardly with little overall direction. The Liberation School, Pregnancy Testing, and the Alice Hamilton Women's Health Center (which never became a reality) were some of the early proposals. Much of the collective energy at that time had to be poured into the organization itself, to open an office and to debate issues such as structure, dues and staff. The organizational forces which have joined to form the Union were not without political differences, and these had to be resolved. For example, one group of almost visionary feminists who had already opened a women's center in Hyde Park were strongly opposed to dues. Other women saw dues as essential both to provide a financial basis for the organization and to strengthen the concept of membership.

As these questions were settled, Union members began to analyze programs in a more systematic way. A conceptual framework was developed in which to evaluate and plan programmatic activities. Largely based on the ideology of an English feminist, Juliet Mitchell, it proposed linking programs around four general areas of women's oppression: production, reproduction, sexuality and the socialization of children. Concomitantly, the organization was developing a strategic analysis regarding the relative priority of projects that would serve the immediate needs of women, programs intended to raise political consciousness, and direct action, confrontational campaigns which would win power for women. This debate was not in conflict with the Mitchell ideology but in some ways carried it further. Both argued explicitly for a planned program direction and implicitly for the kind of organization which would be able to sustain a commitment to a chosen direction.

One chapter in the Union wrote a position paper: *Socialist Feminism: A Strategy for the Women's Movement* which posed the argument for direct action. The women who wrote the paper felt that the initial drive behind the women's movement was flagging. It was time to move in a new direction which would recreate some of the original collective excitement and might also create the climate for a national organization. They argued that it was essential to move on from service projects, however, necessary they were, since a relatively tiny women's movement could not hope to meet the needs of more than a few women; and that consciousness raising, however significant, was not enough since it did not necessarily move women to action for political change. The paper held it was possible to develop a strategy which would win reforms and objectively improve women's lives, as well as give women an increasing sense of their own power, and alter existing power relationships.

The idea was that of open-ended reforms, of building one small victory on another towards a larger goal. In the women's movement, as opposed to the wider activist movement, many "reforms," such as day care centers and abortions on demand, are preconditions for women to be able to work for further and greater change.

The *Socialist Feminism* paper was adopted by the Union as a position paper in 1972 and a number of direct action programs were generated. While members developed experience and skills, none of the programs was spectacularly successful. The question arose as to whether the lack of success was due to specific problems within each campaign, the nature of the Union and its relationship to this kind of program, or the strategy itself. In each issue chosen there were specific problems. The Action Committee for Decent Childcare, the prototype organization which predated and provided some of the material for the *Socialist Feminism* paper, did win on several issues in its year of operation. But eventually it failed - partly because the very nature of its constituency, need for childcare, made it difficult to organize; and partly because the locus of power in the committee was shifting and hard to identify. Similarly, Direct Action for Rights in Employment, campaigning around employment practices by the City of Chicago, found it hard to win much from an adversary like City Hall, although they did win a degree of trust from a highly oppressed group of workers.

The CWLU Health Project, the first program conceived as a combination of education, service and direct action, was much too ambitious to succeed. Later, two more realistic programs also foundered. The Women's Hospital Project, a joint venture between Union members eager to develop a struggle program and women health activists, suffered from lack of a tangible target. Later the experience of the Abortion Task Force illustrated how even victories could backfire. The Task Force was involved in pressuring hospitals for the availability of second trimester abortions. A suit was launched against the Board of Health regulations applied to clinics, particularly the requirement that women wait twenty-four hours for an abortion. This legal action resulted in the quashing of all regulations including those dealing with sanitation standards, an outcome far from what the Task Force had intended.

These issues may not have been the best chosen, or the tactical implementation of each campaign may have been ill-conceived, but it became evident that the Union did not provide a political base for effective struggle programs. For this reason, organizations like Women Employed had to be established outside the Union. Several factors are involved in CWLU's inability to sustain projects, or even to set any consistent direction for program.

Each activity seems to be developed on an ad-hoc basis in response to individual or collective enthusiasm.

Although there has been much discussion about linking projects to fit an ideological framework, it has been difficult even to do this at the minimal level of offering a course in the Liberation School which would complement the activities of another work group. The super-structure of elected co-chairs, planning committee and steering committee is required to approve new program but in the past has often seemed to give approval to any program which does not conflict with the organization's political principles rather than setting organizational priorities. The lack of ability to decide on a clear programmatic direction lies partly in an ambivalence over the question of leadership, partly in disunity in the organization, and partly in the conception of the staff role (and also in the problem of lack of funds and consequent lack of sufficient staff).

Ambivalence about leadership comes from the determination to be open and democratic. This is obviously a good approach, but in practice it has combined at times with the disunity to create a stalemate. Energy which could have gone into program has instead been centered in ideological argument. Over the years the Union has struggled to develop a viable structure, democracy, sisterhood. Each issue has been argued out painfully, slowly. The staff role can be seen as an extension of this problem; in contrast to Women Employed, the paid Union staff members are not identified as organizers, but as members of the organization with administrative skills. Yet, if an organization is to fulfill its commitment to a certain program direction, the staff are almost required to organize for that direction.

The concern to integrate structure and politics is crucial to an understanding of the Union because it provides both strength and weakness. Since the process of political change is as important in creating a new society as the change itself, the kind of organization built now will determine the kind of society created in the future. Social transformation alone is not enough: it requires personal transformation, and vice versa. The two must be held in tension. More concretely, those groups whose political analyses require a primary concentration on one or the other must also be held in tension. This is why the organization tolerates sectarian pre-party formations, and an extraordinarily high level of general disunity. This strong belief has kept the Union together as an organization for six years.

Yet, the whole concept is paralyzing; for it has required the political center forces in the Union to be constantly in the position of responding and negotiating either with women who see class as the crucial variable and working class women as the only correct constituency, or with its somewhat less organized members who still see middle class, white, mobile women as a viable constituency.

Although the general position of the Union seems to recognize that service and education activities alone will not build a broad-based militant women's movement, its members have not been able to develop multi-level programs with a struggle component and are not willing to attempt a single-issue program like Women Employed's campaign against job discrimination. Many of them argue that a single-issue program cannot move people towards making changes in society as opposed to changes in their own lives. They also see it as both dangerous and manipulative to mobilize women around a single issue with no consciousness of how that issue is linked to the other forces of oppression in their lives. For these women, the style of newer organizations like Women Employed com-

promises the idea of an open organization that creates unity and builds program. Yet their organization, the Union, has not found a satisfactory way to resolve the conflict between an open organization and the ability to choose and follow a program direction.

The pragmatic approach

Meanwhile, Women Employed, an essentially pragmatic organization, continues to grow and flourish. Its constituency is among women who work in the Loop, the downtown area of Chicago. Priority was initially placed on organizing women in the insurance industry, women in banking, and women working as secretaries, particularly those in legal firms. The membership is predominantly white and fairly young, although WE attracts more older women than most organizations. It is true that there is very little ideological debate in its meetings and very little disunity. Many of the women who are committed to Women Employed would be unlikely to be interested in the kind of questions with which the Union membership struggles. Yet the organization's confrontational tactics with employers and its pressure on government agencies to enforce the law have unquestionably raised the political consciousness of many of the women involved.

In a period of economic recession, the organization has given women both a structure and a context to discuss questions such as affirmative employment action versus job seniority, the politics of unemployment compensation, and the accountability of elected officials. Women Employed plans to further this program by moving into a unionizing campaign. The extent to which the agitation around jobs has extended into other aspects of women's lives is not clear, though for some the organization has provided a comfortable and increasingly feminist social environment.

Part of Women Employed's success is due to the fact that its issue is timely. Some also has come from its tactical sophistication, detailed planning, and use of the media. A little luck has also been involved. In the case of Kraft Foods, for example, women workers at Kraft asked WE for help in changing the employment policies and procedures. Their request and their ability to obtain payroll documents from within Kraft Foods gave Women Employed its first major victory and did much to establish its presence as an organization. Through pressure on the company itself, on the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, and finally on the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Women Employed initiated an investigation into Kraft's entire affirmative action status. As a direct result, the company's affirmative action plan had to be rewritten, and many employees were given raises or promotions.

The media has been used very successfully to create a presence for Women Employed and to build public support for its campaigns. The struggle against Kraft, for example, was publicized through editorials of the evening news programs of a major Chicago television station. Pressure on the company was increased, and additional women working at Kraft were able to identify WE as a place to bring their own data on discrimination. Publicity, as effective as this, reflects the organization's work to develop mutually beneficial relationships with reporters sympathetic to fair employment practices and its professional approach of calling on the media only with material of real news value. WE has also worked to make some actions newsworthy by employing a creative and humorous approach. In one action stuffed dummies were used to represent executives of a banking firm who had failed to keep their agreed-upon appointment. In another in-

stance, discriminatory employers of legal secretaries were put on trial in a mocking skit. The organization has also remained in the public eye by scheduling meetings that draw large numbers of women, such as, an accountability session with Governor Walker or its annual conventions with 500 to 600 delegates.

In addition to its regular program, the organization provides a counseling service for individual women with job discrimination problems, and is establishing an information network for monitoring employment policies in different companies. It is also beginning a campaign against a large insurance company which will be coordinated with similar campaigns against the same company by sister organizations in Boston and San Francisco. As long as the organization can continue to fund staff and can continue to win against different firms, its potentiality for growth is great. Women Employed has demonstrated its ability to make organizational decisions.

The political approach

If there is a price for this glory, it revolves around the central and much debated issue of the staff role. Unlike in the Union, Women Employed staff are organizers and hold much of the power. Some brought considerable experience from other organizations and came with a commitment to developing viable organizational structures. Others have been recruited from the membership but seem to identify quickly with an organizing role. When the organization was established, an important function of the staff was to develop women from the membership into leadership roles. A democratic decision making structure was established early in Women Employed's history; but the staff organizes for the decisions that are made, discussing issues with key members. With this mode of operation, the membership is somewhat dependent upon the vision of the staff for its direction. In the case of Women Employed that vision has been clearly appropriate, but the process of the organization does not demand that it remain so.

The links that should exist between the Union and Women Employed have been broken. The differences between the two organizations outweigh the similarities and the shared history. The organizing thrust behind Women Employed came from women who had been involved in the process of establishing the Union, but who found the structure of the Union too confining for the development of a program like Women Employed. Part of the problem lay in the Union's determinedly "radical" approach and its members' language, appearance and general cultural background. More importantly, perhaps, was a real political difference about the kind of organization that should be built. WE could hardly exist as it is today if it had been responsible to the Steering Committee of the Union. It might have been possible, however, for the Union to provide a left-wing presence in Women Employed which would have offered a more inclusive radical alternative into which people could have moved if they felt inclined. Mass-based, direct-action organizations are often criticized for not being politically explicit or ideological enough, but a left presence within their own structure or links with other organizations to the left of themselves can provide a solution to this problem.

Successful movements have learned to build and tolerate different programs through which people can become involved or can move as they are ready. One of the strengths of Women Employed lies in its ability to involve inexperienced women. The Union is less able to do so because it is perceived as too ideological. It is able to

attract a large number of women who need a single service but are not interested in joining the organization. While the services reach a clientele that is primarily poor -- Black, white, and Latin working-class women -- the membership is predominantly still the stereotypical activists of the 1960s: white, middle-class, young and college educated (both dropouts and those with degrees). Women Employed has basically drawn on this same group for staff and attracts a similar membership, but it has also reached more lower middle-class and working-class women. Most likely, if the Union had been flexible enough to work with Women Employed, it would now have had a broader base and a greater sense of vitality and power.

Both Women Employed and the Union have formal and informal ties to other organizations at national and local levels. Both organizations were innovative when established and served as models for other structures: Women Employed for Nine to Five in Boston, and Women Organized for Employment in San Francisco, with whom it is now linked in the insurance company campaign mentioned earlier. In Chicago, Women Employed shares some political affinity with the Chicago chapter of the National Organization for Women, some mixed, non-feminist organizations including the Citizens Action Program and Citizens for a Better Environment, as well as the Midwest Academy which offers training programs for organizers. Through the nature of its work it is also linked to the Chicago chapter of Concerned Labor Union Women.


Similarly, the Union has provided a model for organizations like itself, such as the Twin Cities Women's Union and the Berkeley/Oakland Women's Union. These organizations and others with a similar political understanding worked together to sponsor a national conference on socialist feminism last year, which may have laid some of the groundwork for a national organization. In Chicago, the Union's political affinity is now more with organizations of the mixed left than those of the women's movement. It shares political style, some priorities and some concepts above movement building with radical organizations like Rising Up Angry and the New World Resource Center.

If women are really to build a powerful movement, however, it seems important that it should be inclusive rather than exclusive, a multi-level movement of separate but integrated organizations that can work towards common goals. Organizations like the Union cannot afford to ignore programs and organizations like Women Employed which have enormous vitality and potential for growth. Similarly, organizations like Women Employed cannot afford to ignore organizations like the Union which can help to move their membership to more extensive political activity.

Women Employed has chosen a more limited goal than the Union and has developed a more successful model: it has created a structure which can change the objective conditions of working women and can also change their political consciousness, but not one in which social change is inherent. The Union has the potentiality but not yet the capacity to integrate the personal and political changes necessary to build a different vision of society and social relationships. This obviously complex task is one for which there are no models and no easy answers. The Union has survived a period of intense experimentation with different tactics, different issues, different kinds of programs and different kinds of approach. Now it has the experience to build an organization that will fulfill its potential, strengthen and integrate the movement in Chicago and, possibly, throughout the nation.

Whatever Happened

John Kretzman, a free lance writer and staff member of the Associated Colleges of the Midwest's Urban Studies Program, was active in the antiwar and counter-cultural movements of the sixties and early seventies.



to the Counterculture?

by John Kretzman

August, 1968: A warm Sunday Evening in Lincoln Park, on Chicago's Northside. Two rock bands occupy opposite ends of the park's south end. Acoustic guitarists and even two or three blues players have gathered small audiences. Knots of people gather, talk softly about what to expect in the next week, sing some songs from their common heritage, pass a joint or two, move to the next group. Allen Ginsberg arrives, quickly collects a group of disciples, begins the slow and hypnotic chanting of "Om." A group of Yippies under the leadership of master-clown Abbie Hoffman pile into the park carrying numbers of effigies and one very live piglet. A guerrilla theater troupe meanders southward, stopping occasionally to perform part of their repertoire. Their skits are various, some comic, some serious, wordless, with mime and movement. The dramatic themes are important to the people gathered in Lincoln Park on this evening — the Democratic Party Convention, participatory democracy, the rights of Black people, and the Vietnam War — always the war.

For this gathering of young people from all over the country — some flamboyant rhetoricians even copied from Black nationalists and called it the "Youth Nation" — was certainly generated by the war, and by the reactive turmoil which for a while seemed ready to engulf an entire generation of young white folks. They gathered in Chicago during that summer of 1968 for an avowedly political purpose, to confront the Democratic Party's presidential nominating convention and to present that party with a massive show of dissent from the policies which had led both to Vietnam and to an ineffectiveness in addressing inequities at home.

Most of these young folks in Lincoln Park were obviously not your typical hard-driving, pragmatic politicians. They were, instead, denizens of what back then was called the counterculture — that strange and in some ways unique blend of political dissent, simplified lifestyles, and eclectic cultural expressions which bloomed and withered within half a decade in the late sixties. This gathering happened in spite of months of graphic warnings from Chicago's Mayor Richard Daley, leaders of the Democratic Party, and the Mayor's police. The week-long happening

represented perhaps *the* climactic moment in the life of the counterculture, and particularly in its adoption of a militant political stance.

In Chicago as in other major cities, the mid-sixties had seen the development of counterculture communities. Whole sections of neighborhoods were transformed into havens for the long-hairs. They dressed strangely, spoke a modified imitation of Black street English, cultivated primitive tastes in music, arts and crafts, and seemingly rejected a wide range of traditional American values and attitudes.

From the northern section of Old Town, the longhairs spread their papers, craftshops, coffeehouses and communes northwest up Lincoln Avenue, and thence to other parts of the northside. Without plan, there came into being the Windy City's contribution to a growing national network of what some of the movement's leading theorists were then calling "liberated zones." It seemed almost as if sections of certain communities had linked up in a visible and simultaneous act of cultural secession from the mainstream Union. From the Lower East Side, through Ann Arbor and Madison, to the Haight-Ashbury and Berkeley, and in many other spots in between — the counterculture communities played variations on their similar themes. Mobile and middle-class young people moved easily among these communities, secure in the knowledge that what they would find would be very much like what they had left.

Chicago, though never a center of countercultural activity comparable to New York or the Bay Area, was still the headquarters for a lively, if often struggling, "underground scene." Like many other elements of life in this highly political, working-class city, Chicago's counterculture was by necessity more politically oriented than either New York's arts-and-drugs scene or San Francisco's music-and-nature concentration. It was more difficult in this clout-concentrated setting to create both geographical and psychological space for self-defining communities and institutions. Unlike the East and West coast scenes, Chicago's counterculture community was forced continually

to acknowledge the "real world." Unfriendly aldermen, nit-picking building inspectors and shutterbugging Red Squad minions were forever intruding on the dream of free and loving community. As one result, Chicago's counterculture avoided the most extreme and romantic separatist illusions which flourished elsewhere. The "greening" of Chicago was an impossible notion. But typically, too, Chicago produced many of the wildest, most romantic, and most implausibly violence-oriented political leaders of the New Left.

This peculiar combination of countercultural commitment and political frustration was reflected in Chicago's major underground newspaper, *The Seed*, which rebounded schizophrenically from love and psychedelics and rock music, to hard-line leftist politics and rock music – and back again. Editor Abe Peck and his mostly inexperienced and transient staff found themselves faced with the typical counterculture dilemmas: How to maintain a level of efficiency which would allow them to produce at least semi-regular issues, while at the same time attempting to share responsibilities and operate collectively? How to blend psychedelic design with political criticism and exhortations? How to respond to and reflect a large number of small constituencies, from hard-line New Left splinter groups to communes of cultural anarchists? And above all, how to make enough money to keep both themselves and their paper afloat?

Many of the currently active Northside theater people passed through similar struggles as they committed themselves to overtly political dramatic expression. And for a number of years, these dilemmas would have sounded all too familiar to the members of the antiwar collective running the best counterculture music spot in town, Alice's Restaurant (briefly resurrected as Alice's Revisited).

A nationwide bursting out of these cultural and lifestyle developments led many young people, and not a few older heads, to look forward to a "greening of America." The alternative values of these young rebels, the warmth and openness they preached, would turn this crass and materialistic society around. Well, in short, it didn't happen that way, and an exploration of what really happened to the counterculture might prove quite valuable. In many of the discussions conducted in connection with this article, a pervasive cynicism seems to have struck down the visions of quick and total social transformation.

Clearly the outward signs of the counterculture have either disappeared, or have been so totally absorbed by the mainstream as to be virtually meaningless except as so many more consumer objects. Long hair becomes chic or gauche with the same rapidity as changes in skirt lengths. Soft drugs find a home in suburbia, while harder drugs reinforce race and class divisions. The music of the sixties is now big business. Simple living is the slogan of the subdivider.

The list of short-lived countercultural institutions in a city like Chicago is long and instructive. It includes papers like *the Seed*, *The Daily Planet*, the *Chicago Express*, and others. It embraces coffeehouses and small listening clubs, guerrilla theater groups, arts and crafts collectives, and any number of ad hoc groups which formed from time to time to put together festivals, fairs, benefits and concerts.

But today the "greening" of Lincoln Park and other Northside neighborhoods has taken an ironic twist. The green is still visible there, but it is now very clearly the color of money. The hip neighborhoods of West Lincoln Park and especially New Town have become chic and eminently desirable. Real estate entrepreneurs large and small have moved in to transform the old working-class communities with their brick two and three-flat buildings into mod Houses Beautiful. Formerly cheap or at least

reasonably rentable crash pads now boast polished oak floors, rediscovered fireplaces and rents in the \$300 per month category. East-West business streets like North Avenue, Webster, Diversey and Belmont are crammed with businesses and eateries which cater to a whole new generation of hip, young professionals. Lawyers, doctors, teachers and social workers flock home to these neighborhoods every afternoon at five, doff their suits and matching outfits in favor of jeans and a workshirt, and flock to their favorite evening hangouts. At night, these main streets, Clark, Broadway and good old Lincoln Avenue, are filled with bar-hoppers addicted to the very healthy live music scene. Probably never before in the city's history has any area outside of the Loop offered such a wide variety of live music to such an eager, receptive and affluent audience. On any given night, one can choose among folk music, rock, jazz, blues and even classical.

Without framework counterculture fades

As one begins to explore the question of what happened to all of the counterculture's effort and energy, why this significant flash of generational creativity was snuffed out so quickly, one is forced to turn for explanations first of all to factors totally outside of the control of any who were involved in the counterculture. Certainly the economic contraction which accompanied the end of the Vietnam War tightened the reins on social and cultural experimentation. In a shrunken job market, the luxury of dabbling in new lifestyles had to be tempered by the reality factors involved in hustling for a living. Certainly too the almost unquenchable fascination and limitless attention paid to the more bizarre aspects of the counterculture by mainstream society, and particularly by the mass media, served to distort and absorb elements of the "new thing" before they had a chance to develop and mature. Herbert Marcuse's notion of repressive tolerance, the ability of advanced capitalist society to deflate opposition tendencies by absorbing them to harmless extensions of the mainstream, was surely at work in the case of the counterculture.

But perhaps more interesting, and less examined, are the reasons for the downfall of the counterculture which inhered in three aspects of its very nature. The three aspects involve first, a confusion about the necessary relationships between culture and politics; second, a series of limitations inherent in its major constituency; and third, an inability, due to inexperience and naiveté, to build a lasting organizational and institutional framework.

First, what is the proper relationship between culture and politics, particularly opposition politics? In retrospect, it seems clear that the most lively and creative years in the counterculture were precisely those years when ties between culture and opposition politics, particularly the civil rights and antiwar movements, were strongest, when young people took seriously and self-consciously the "counter" half of their label. These times – and they were in fact sporadic rather than steady periods – embodied what seems to me still to be a most important insight, namely that culture and politics *are* intimately intertwined. From the mid to late sixties, as often as not, the counterculture provided ritual expression and community for activists. It provided also a path into political activism for thousands of young people coming of age in America. Chicago's young people might hear folksinger Phil Ochs or the country group Wilderness Road at Alice's one night and at an antiwar rally the next. It was no accident that the Johnsons and Nixons deplored "hippies and draft-dodgers" in the same phrase.

For many young people, though by no means all of them, counter-culture and counter-politics were experienced as a unity.

But by the late sixties, this fortuitous marriage had all but finally split. The counterculture had strayed from its primary roots in the civil rights and antiwar and student movements. Politicos became politicians, and hippies became hippies, and each went their own way. It was not too long before many of the politicians found themselves isolated from community in three-piece suits or small Marxist-Leninist study groups; and many of the hippies woke up in an ad agency.

Rich heritage backs Black movements

In the urban Black communities, the sixties brought forth somewhat parallel developments – a new flowering of Afro-American cultural activity in tandem with a revived militancy on the political front. Black pride and Black power were linked both rhetorically and actually. Creative artists in music, in theater, and in prose and poetry reopened the rich veins of traditional culture as the basis on which to express new versions of the Black experience. Poet Don L. Lee and others worked at recapturing the rhythmic incantations of Black English for the new protest-oriented constituency, while historian Lerone Bennett uncovered a long and proud history of resistance and rebellion in the Black past.

As one examines this most recent Black renaissance, two characteristics stand out in sharp contrast to the development of the white counterculture. First, Black artists and community leaders were able to draw from a long and rich cultural heritage which, however it had been submerged in recent decades, was still meaningful to large segments of the Black community. The young whites, by way of contrast, had no such reservoir on which to draw, and consequently found themselves attempting to stitch together fragments of other peoples' experience – primarily Black peoples' and Native American peoples' – into a kind of patchwork pattern.

Further, the Black community, by virtue of its position of general exclusion from the larger society, never really had the option of considering culture and politics as separable phenomena. To express racial pride was to develop community solidarity for political struggle. In Chicago, cultural nationalist institutions such as the Institute for Positive Education; Black community theater groups like X-Bag (Experimental Black Actors' Guild), the Kuumba Workshop, and Lemont Xeno; the seemingly eclectic combination of political activism, Black religion and cultural pride in the Rev. Jesse Jackson's Saturday morning gatherings – all fused politics and culture in their development. This recognition may go a long way toward explaining the continued existence, and even health, of all of the projects noted above.

Build-in shortcomings

But while questions of community survival and political struggle define the very nature of Black cultural organizations, these same issues proved to be much less immediate for the basic constituency of the counterculture – the white, mobile, cosmopolitan-oriented, well-educated middle- and upper-middle class young folks. The obstacles raised by this constituency problem are many, as the counterculturalists quickly discovered. Youth is not only transitory as a stage of life – in America it is downright rootless. The difficulty of building sustained and sustain-

ing communities around people who are always on the go, always becoming something or someone new, is enormous.

Perhaps equally problematic was the effort to sort out the positive from the negative aspects of middle-class identity. Counterculture projects and communities in Chicago and elsewhere often foundered on what was called "ego-tripping," a phenomenon which was simply an extension of the worst aspects of middle-class license granted in the slogan "do your own thing." In fact, how such an extreme individualism could co-exist happily with a contradictory pull toward communalism remained a central dilemma throughout the sixties.

In addition, the racial exclusivity of much of the counterculture made cooption by the mainstream culture much easier. Many of the basic demands put forth by the counterculture related not at all to the survival and development needs of the Black community, but to the narrowly conceived self-interest of the new white lifestyle. Loosen the marijuana laws, produce and market the music more efficiently, pull back the tactical squads from concert duty, and you've given many young white folks all they were ever asking for.

And finally, a salutary and often deeply held commitment to participatory and democratic forms of decision making was often extended beyond the point of usefulness in both New Left and counterculture communities. Strong leadership was frequently discouraged and even squelched, most often with the acquiescence of the talented leaders themselves. Verbal and organizational skills which are acquired virtually by osmosis in the normal course of growing up middle class, and which could have proved very helpful in sustaining activity on both the cultural and political levels, were instead regarded with suspicion and even outright hostility. As a result, many a newspaper, coffeehouse and political group ended up thrashing about without a consistent direction.

This final failure of the counterculture, its inability to build lasting organizational and institutional structures, is obviously connected to both the political uncertainty and middle-class origins of the sixties groups. But this is an issue which can be explored by contrasting the many failures with some of those sixties projects which have in fact survived and flourished.

In white Lincoln Park, institutional survival has been based on a combination of entrepreneurial acuity, attention to the development of a constituency, and a soft-peddling if not an outright denial of a countercultural identity. This lively and well-heeled community supports a number of institutions which grew out of the counterculture. Besides the music clubs, a number of new theater troupes have made a go of it. The Body Politic, three-stage center located in the heart of the Lincoln Avenue hip strip, is flourishing. So are groups such as the Organic Theater, headquartered in the Uptown Hull House; the Drama Shelter on Halsted in West Lincoln Park; the Travel Light Company, which takes its productions from pub to pub on a regular schedule; and the recently formed MoMing, a dance school and performance group. All of these troupes provide a creative and experimental alternative to the basically stodgy Loop houses, as well as to the syrupy suburban supper-and-show spots. Their facilities are spare. The audiences are likely to be placed on folding chairs in a setting which emphasizes the closeness between viewers and performers. Prices are reasonable, usually falling in the \$2 to \$4 range. The productions themselves tend toward the avant-garde, with many of the local troupes experimenting in the "non-literary" and non-verbal traditions of mime, movement, musical and "story" theater. But this lively and interesting little

theater scene is not, by and large, self-consciously political and does not attract official hostility. In fact, when the Body Politic was found to be in violation of the city's stiff building code for theaters, Paul Zimmerer, Director of Mayor Daley's Committee on Economic and Cultural Development, went to bat and got the City Council to write an exception into the ordinance.

Currently the major weekly newspaper serving the young, hip, white Northsiders is *The Reader*. Both Roth, the editor and publisher of the successful four-year-old paper, may typify some basic attitudes of post-counterculture entrepreneurs. He is neither a typical business type nor is he by any stretch of the imagination a "hippie." He is a young professional who is willing, as he puts it, "to put in a hell of a lot of time on the business end of this thing just so that we can get the pleasure of publishing what we think is good writing." Roth and his talented staff do march to a slightly different drummer than their counterparts in more mass-oriented publications. Their basic commitment, however, is not to some public agenda for change, but rather to a set of shared criteria involving the more private matters of taste and aesthetic judgment.

Interestingly enough, *The Reader* has thrived and expanded by pursuing a system of free distribution and by cultivating an advertising market made up mostly of young, hip small entrepreneurs. The paper is available at almost every bar, restaurant, book store, health food store, theater and jeans shop where the affluent young hang out — and almost all of these businesses advertise heavily in the paper. *The Reader* is one center for a kind of network of small entrepreneurs, all serving the same basic constituency of urbanized sixties survivors.

Roth calculates that the success of *The Reader* is based squarely on this bulletin-board function. As a result, he has managed to avoid one of the major pitfalls of counterculture journals, the tendency to become almost totally dependent on advertising from the music industry, particularly the record companies, for survival. Having dodged this "Rolling Stone syndrome," Roth and his staff are able to run a wide range of reviews, selectively covering concerts, records, club acts, theater openings and even poetry readings without having to acknowledge every record that Columbia or Motown releases.

These reviews fill the major portion of *The Reader's* newshole each week, but every issue also contains a few other articles. The longish lead is often political, covering the doings of independent politicians and community groups, or offering a dissenting angle on some ongoing city issue. A "Neighborhood Notes" column covers controversies in the Northside neighborhoods where the paper's readership is concentrated. Features cover a variety of topics often avoided by the weekend supplements to the major dailies, anything from a report on life as a pressman in the bowels of the *Tribune* building to the inside story of Bobbi Arnstein, the *Playboy* executive and Hugh Hefner confidant who committed suicide late last summer. (This latter story, Roth reports, got more reader response than anything the paper had run in two years.)

Hope lies with the community-builders

In the Black community as well, new cultural institutions are fighting the battle for survival. If anything, the struggle for resources is even tougher. As the Kuumba Workshop's Francis Ward explains, "With the seventies, we all had to move from rhetoric to institution building. That meant learning how to hustle support from wherever we could without becoming dependant on it. But it also meant developing deep roots in the Black community and

increasing the community's involvement in what we were doing."

The attempt to instill community pride and involvement in Black cultural life has had its ups and downs. In part because Black cultural institutions have had to face continuing and severe survival questions, they have been forced to keep both feet planted in the political struggle for Black liberation. Some have suffered setbacks: Lu Palmer, the talented Black columnist for the *Chicago Daily News* who quit his spot at Field Enterprises over a series of editorial disputes, tried to launch a militant independent weekly newspaper. The *Black X-Press* sputtered along for a year and a half before folding last year under considerable financial pressure. Some theater groups have folded as well.

But Kuumba and those other groups which have survived seemed determined to retain a measure of their original political spunk, partly out of ideological commitment and partly out of a continuing need to relate their projects to the only available source of support, the Black community. Ward and his co-workers are overtly political about their project. They advocate, for instance, collective approach to the theater arts, and often mount works which satirize the mass-produced icons of official Black culture. "The Image-Makers," Kuumba's biting parody of Blaxploitation films, has been the group's most successful effort, having run off and on for well over two years. This political statement has brought personal, often anonymous, harassment upon the group's directors.

The experience of both the Black and White communities over the last few years has underscored the need for both counter and alternative culture advocates to pay close attention to the practical craft of institution building. But is also clear that in the white community particularly, a simple injection of organizational sense does not guarantee anything beyond survival. Left unanswered is the key question of survival for what.

But it may be altogether too easy to conclude this overview of the counterculture on a negative note. Instead, what may be more valuable for those of us who have a stake in changing our cities and our nation, is a last look at a few of the undeniably positive elements of this wave that has mostly receded. Think for a moment about that cluster of values which represented the best of the counterculture — the strong impulse toward the creation of community, and of communal lifestyles; that strain of behavior which involved a rejection of consumerism and adopted a kind of voluntary poverty; within limits, the careful attention paid to a decentralized structure and a democratic form of decision-making; the recovery of a deep bond with nature; the often moving commitment to ritual and ceremony as necessary foci for loving human community. These tendencies were in the sixties and remain today insightful and positive alternatives to daily life in mainstream modern America.

The technocratic mindset which dominates our thinking about cities cannot conceive of life in the urban setting as anything but a long series of "problems" and "solutions." But one cannot quantify cultural dilemmas, nor impose new values through guidelines from Washington. Either these elements are inherited and adapted to new situations, as in the case of the Black community, or they must be generated anew out of profound dissatisfaction, as in the case of the rootless whites of the counterculture. It may well be that the hope for a humanized urban future lies not with the technocrats, but with the community-builders. If this is true, we must make one last bow in the direction of the counterculturists: at the very least, they were asking the right questions. We shall all be asking them again.

STEELWORKERS *continued from page 33*

turing worker Joe Romano, there were mikes on the floor for people to vent their gripes, unheard of in the union before. Sadlowski has attended dozens of local union meetings, bringing the director and the members closer together, and he is constantly tramping the fields to talk with disgruntled or curious workers. Black and Chicano workers, who appeared to have supported Sadlowski overwhelmingly, are apparently becoming more active, although there have been no dramatic changes in their situation in the industry. "The biggest change he's made is that I know I can walk in there to the district office and talk to him," Ted Jordan said. "It's like our home," added Modesto Caborales, another Sadlowski supporter.

Although the discontents and desires of steel workers like Jordan and Caborales brought Ed Sadlowski to the district director's office, it is also true that Ed Sadlowski was instrumental in pulling together the great mass of often divergent rebellious motivations among workers in steel and related industries. His own personal qualities were important: dedication, relentless work, a direct and egalitarian style, toughmindedness mixed with compassion, and a persuasive manner of speaking. The accident of Germano's retirement, followed by the slating of a lackluster candidate, helped greatly. Germano would have been harder to beat. Also, the relative decline of the mature industries represented by the Steel Workers union made the business-style unionism of Germano less and less tenable. The deteriorating trade-off in wages and benefits was no longer so attractive to workers, especially since promotions were available much more slowly and layoffs more of a hazard of working life even after many years in the mills.

The impact of the sixties

The movements of the sixties, of Blacks, Chicanos, students, opponents of the Vietnam war and women, all had their impact. Hopes and expectations were raised. A sense of possibilities for popular power and organization had spread. The legitimacy of protest and of demands for control over one's life were more firmly established.

Within the labor movement, new developments ranging from Cesar Chavez and the farmworkers to the Miners for Democracy and the Lordstown autoworkers strike stirred up the fires of worker militancy in the early seventies. Such resistance was also spurred by the generalized economic crisis crunching workers on the job and in the parts of their lives which were outside the workplace but still dependent on the threatened paycheck. Sadlowski was, like the workers who rallied to him, a product of those times. He was criticized by older staff representatives for having a United Farm Workers "Viva La Revolution" poster on his wall, and for comparing the antiwar demonstrators at the 1968 Democratic Convention to the victims of the 1937 Republic Steel attack. When I mentioned the Lordstown strike of 1972 to a Sadlowski worker, he smiled and said, with clear admiration, "I hear those guys don't take no shit." The success of Miners for Democracy in fighting union bossism and corruption was inspiration of another sort.

Sادلowski's strength was in crystallizing these diverse sentiments of frustrated aspirations. The language, style and issue appeal of the campaign all had an organic, immediate relationship to working class culture. It was an inside job.

Now in office, Sadlowski faces numerous serious difficulties. One is the question of "institutionalization" to which he is so sensitive. For other labor union insurgents, such as Arnold Miller, the problem has shown up especially with wildcat strikes and other unofficial actions.

With pressure from the government, management, and top level union officers, lower level union representatives are expected to stop any unofficial job action or strike. So far Sadlowski has avoided a major crisis on this front. During one wildcat strike in northern Indiana, Sadlowski reportedly visited the strikers several times, indicated his support for their demands, and privately arranged for legal assistance, while avoiding any official support which could get the union in legal troubles.

Another problem is closely related to Sadlowski's success in expressing current grievances as well as he does. Can he exercise leadership which will take workers in the union beyond their current conceptions? If he begins to involve himself in politics, locally and nationally, will he suffer from a split within the ranks of his supporters, who may be united in wanting a tough union but very divided on political issues and candidates? That will be especially difficult since Sadlowski's political views are more radical than most union leaders. He is neither leaning to Humphrey nor particularly attracted by the more liberal wing of Harris or Udall in the current presidential scramble, for example. None of them, he says, really seems to be confronting the issues. Steelworkers Fight Back has expanded into the local legislative arena, backing the wife of one activist as an independent Democratic candidate for state representative. But there is a problem among the steel workers, as in other unions, that many workers, even militants, don't think their union should be in politics: also, maintaining union solidarity while ending racial discrimination will force Sadlowski to take positions which strain the broad consensus which brought him into office. And beyond all this, for more radical supporters, there is the question of whether Sadlowski can or will want to try to push beyond trade union consciousness and begin to raise the kinds of structural issues of control and organization of production which socialists argue must eventually be made explicit.

All this relates to a third problem of accountability. The informal organization and the constant pressure from the International so far have guaranteed that Sadlowski and Steelworkers Fight Back keep in very close touch with the district's workers. But without explicit programs and without any formal means of keeping leadership accountable to supporters, the rank-and-file must have a great deal of trust or, if disappointed, can only vote out a director they don't like. Of course, formal machinery and specific pledges will not guarantee democracy. Steelworkers Fight Back has committed itself to a much more flexible, loose, intuitive process. Attractive as it is, such informality can easily be abused. The tension between exercising leadership and responding to the wishes of supporters – the heart of the organizational question – has been dealt with imaginatively by Sadlowski but the problem has not by any means disappeared.

Despite criticism that he has not been militant enough in pushing some strikes or in opposing Abel, Sadlowski does seem to have stirred up rank-and-file action. That, after all, was his main program and main promise. Neither he nor his supporters claimed Sadlowski would magically change the union. "We'd shy away from saying Eddie had a solution," John Chico said. "We'd say he'd be more receptive." So far Sadlowski has been able to succeed as agitator of the rank-and-file and an increasingly probable, although far from certain, successor to I.W. Abel as president of steel workers union. The institution does not appear to have trapped him, although his supporters are ready to fight him if it does. The major change in the union following the election seems to be in the mood. As 22-year old Mike Hoffman remarked, "What it's done is to create some hope."

POEMS

The Third Eye / Duane Ackerson

sees the place where the grass is pink
 can see itself behind itself
 sees the clock counting time like a miser
 watches the sun being carried across the sky
 in the belly of a transparent goldfish
 and the wind becoming grass
 and nesting on trees disguised as leaves.
 The third eye see angels in refrigerators,
 dragons in stalled cars
 it sees Lot's wife turning into salt
 over a businessman's lunch
 sees the sand castle leaving the beach
 and rising in the sea a wave at a time.

Spawn of the Shadow / Duane Ackerson

The shadow has children:
 suddenly, where one shadow stood,
 there are dozens,
 all beginning to stream off in all directions,
 looking for something to resemble.

Fortunately, it's high noon —
 many things lack shadows.
 Soon a bank has an alter ego
 that looks like a poodle,
 a tree has a fat lady,
 a car has a cockroach,
 an ant, a bulldozer.
 Each shadow through slow subversion
 makes a substantial change,
 a flatterer turning a king to hostage.
 The mother watches, as the sun declines,
 her children rise in the world.

pigeon / John Ronan

run by one muscle, a pigeon
 struts and clucks at once
 impeccable hiccups
 and easy agreement —
 like us,
 original pigeons sinned by giving in.

fly / John Ronan

a fly lands on a dogshit, thinking
 Big Rock Candy Mountain,
 eats,
 then flies off thanking god
 for its new, brown boots.

Self Photography / Francis Duren

You peer,
 glass eyes behind
 a glass lens.

A taut cat
 eyeing a bird.

Light rushes.
 The shutter jumps.

A life is sliced,
 frozen,
 framed.

And you don't
 look like yourself.

Divorce / Gayle E. Wood

Some proof is needed
 to mark a death:
 scabs big as frost heaves
 to pick at or
 a pile of feathers and bones.

I wanted to crawl in the grave
 yard, pull up the flowers,
 scrape stones with a tin can
 saying, Under your fist of silence
 a corpse lives.

In Boston I felt the same.
 Stood on the roof and said
 to the Charles: River,
 I have done it
 I am married.

Handicap / Gayle E. Wood

The old girl
 practices living
 until the real thing comes by,

grins, slowly walks the street.
 Are those *your* teeth
 (Mrs. Guerney's asking)?

Yes, she says, knowing
 what it means to bare your teeth
 the way chimpanzees do and buyers

of horses. The race is on:
 It's even weights for the fillies.
 The old one quit the track.

She takes the key out of a leather bag,
 opens the door, enters, draws the shade,
 hears footsteps on the stair

and never him.
 She thinks her hearing's going,
 memory's gone.

ILLINOIS HOUSE RETURNS *continued from page 11*

District	Location	Candidate	Residence	Age	Occupation	Votes	Per Cent
1	Chicago—South Side	Erwin A. France (D)	Chicago	37	Former Model Cities official	21,007	28.2
		Ralph H. Metcalfe (D) *	Chicago	65	Incumbent	53,427	71.8
		A. A. Rayner (R) *	Chicago	57	Former alderman	Unopposed	
2	Chicago—South Side	Morgan F. Murphy (D) *	Chicago	43	Incumbent	40,527	72.9
		Andrew Tucker (D)	Chicago			15,046	27.1
		Spencer Leak (R) *	Chicago			Unopposed	
3	Chicago—Southwest Suburbs and Southwest	Martin A. Russo (D) *	Chicago	32	Incumbent	Unopposed	
		Glen John Allred (R)	Calumet City	39	Business executive	4,068	17.3
		Ronald Buikema (R) *	South Holland	36	Attorney	13,811	58.6
		Robert C. Gorman (R)	Homewood	31	Realtor	2,827	12.0
		Carl L. Klein (R)	Oaklawn	58	Former assistant U.S. Interior secretary	2,860	12.1
4	Chicago Suburbs—South	Carlos V. Lindsey (D)	Markham	68	Retired building materials salesman	(Returns Unavailable)	
		Ronald A. Rodger (D) *	Tinley Park	31	Teacher		
		Edward J. Derwinski (R) *	Flossmoor	49	Incumbent	Unopposed	
5	Chicago—Central	John G. Fary (D) *	Chicago	64	Incumbent	Unopposed	
		Vincent Kork (R) *	Chicago			Unopposed	
6	Cook County—Northwest Suburbs	Marilyn D. Clancy (D) *	Oak Park	38	Paint firm employee	20,024	65.5
		R. G. Patrick Logan (D)	Oak Park	45	Association official	10,566	34.5
		Henry J. Hyde (R) *	Park Ridge	50	Incumbent	Unopposed	
7	Chicago—Downtown, West Side	Cardiss Collins (D) *	Chicago	44	Incumbent	Unopposed	
8	Chicago—North Central	Daniel D. Rostenkowski (D) *	Chicago	48	Incumbent	Unopposed	
		John F. Urbaszewski (R) *	Chicago	63	Property control inspector	2,513	76.6
		Carl C. LoDico (R)	Chicago	52	Manufacturer	766	23.4
9	Chicago—Northeast, Lake Shore	Sidney R. Yates (D) *	Chicago	66	Incumbent	Unopposed	
		Thomas Joseph Wajerski (R) *	Chicago			Unopposed	
10	Cook County—Northern Suburbs	Abner J. Mikva (D) *	Evanston	50	Incumbent	Unopposed	
		Daniel B. Hales (R)	Winnetka	34	Attorney	13,917	34.4
		John J. Nimrod (R)	Glenview		State senator	6,433	15.9
		Samuel H. Young (R) *	Glenview	53	Attorney, former U.S. Representative	20,150	49.7
11	Chicago—Northwest	Frank Annunzio (D) *	Chicago	61	Incumbent	Unopposed	
		Daniel C. Reber (R) *	Chicago	38	Political science professor	5,527	43.6
		Mitchell G. Zadrozny (R)	Chicago	52	Geographer	4,306	34.0
		Edward D. Kelly (R)	Chicago	69	Retired policeman	2,847	22.4
12	Outer Chicago Suburbs—Arlington Heights	Philip M. Crane (R) *	Mount Prospect	45	Incumbent	Unopposed	
		Edwin L. Frank (D) *	Hoffman Estates	46	Self-employed	Unopposed	
13	Northeast—Elgin, Waukegan	F. James Lumber (D)	Round Lake	40	Attorney	12,142	44.8
		James J. Cummings (D) *	Barrington	48		14,970	55.2
		Robert McClary (R) *	Lake Bluff	68	Incumbent	Unopposed	
14	Outer Chicago Suburbs—DuPage County	Marie Agnes Fese (D) *	Elmhurst	41	Labor union official	12,999	40.6
		Winfield Green (D)	West Chicago	60	Financial relations consultant	8,562	26.8
		Nicholas F. (Nick) Thomas (D)	Hinsdale	51	Regional sales manager	6,879	21.5
		Romaine Troost (D)	Glen Ellyn		Political scientist	3,565	11.1
		John N. Erlenborn (R) *	Glen Ellyn	49	Incumbent	53,190	83.6
15	North Central—Aurora, DeKalb	William A. Broderick (R)	Bensenville	41	Controller	10,454	16.4
		Tim L. Hall (D) *	Dwight	50	Incumbent	Unopposed	
		Tom Corcoran (R) *	Ottawa	36	Railroad executive	18,659	39.1
		John Andrew Cunningham (R)	Aurora	37	Real estate broker	7,819	16.4
		James R. Washburn (R)	Morris	54	State representative	15,603	32.7
16	Northwest—Rockford	Walter B. Lunsford (R)	Mendota	42	Methodist minister	4,034	8.5
		Clarence E. Batchelor (R)	Yorkville			1,556	3.3
16	Northwest—Rockford	John B. Anderson (R) *	Rockford	54	Incumbent	Unopposed	

District	Location	Candidate	Residence	Age	Occupation	Votes	Per Cent
17	Northeast—Joliet, Kankakee	Merlin Karlock (D) *	Momence	44	Banker	Unopposed	
		George M. O'Brien (R) *	Joliet	56	Incumbent	Unopposed	
18	West Central—Peoria, Pekin	Matthew Ryan (D) *	Washington	49	Merchandising executive	25,949	64.2
		George W. Zaehring (D)	Toulon	24	Social worker	5,028	12.4
		Virgil R. Grunkemeyer (D)	Peoria	44	Education professor	9,439	23.4
		Robert H. Michel (R) *	Peoria	53	Incumbent	Unopposed	
19	West—Moline, Rock Island	John Craver (D) *	London Mills	36	Automobile salesman	Unopposed	
		Tom Railsback (R) *	Moline	44	Incumbent	Unopposed	
		Eulalia Lita Grabeklis (Ind)	Rock Falls	54	Teacher—reading specialist	Unopposed	
20	West Central— Springfield, Quincy	Peter Mack (D) *	Springfield	59	Business executive, former U.S. Rep.	Unopposed	
		Paul Findley (R) *	Pittsfield	54	Incumbent	35,919	90.0
		Hank McCune (R)	Godfrey	43	Furniture factory representative	3,980	10.0
21	Central—Champaign- Urbana	Anna Wall Scott (D) *	Urbana	51	College professor	Unopposed	
		Edward R. Madigan (R) *	Lincoln	40	Incumbent	Unopposed	
22	Southeast—Danville	George E. Shipley (D) *	Olney	48	Incumbent	Unopposed	
		Ralph Y. McGinnis (R) *	Charleston			Unopposed	
23	Southwest—East St. Louis	Melvin Price (D) *	East St. Louis	71	Incumbent	Unopposed	
		Sam P. Drenovac (R) *	Granite City			Unopposed	
24	South—Carbondale	Paul Simon (D) *	Carbondale	47	Incumbent	Unopposed	
		Peter G. Prineas (R) *	Carbondale	48	Consulting engineer	Unopposed	

Letters

INTERESTING

F/M: ... we found your publication to be both interesting and well written. Keep up the good work.

Ned Dismukes
Marketing Director
Plus Publications, Inc.
Washington, D.C.

VOTING RECORDS, PLEASE

F/M: I'm writing this letter for two reasons. One, F/M is a great magazine to have in the library. Please continue your excellent "focus" on Missouri issues. Two, why have you dropped the voting record listing for the Missouri and Illinois legislatures? It really is useful! I am not aware of any other publication which provides this service. Can you please continue it by listing the 1974 and 1975 voting records for state legislators on key issues?

Paul M. Duckworth
Asst. Reference Librarian
Springfield-Greene County (Mo.)
Library

Editor's note: Yes, a Missouri and Illinois voting record issue for 1975 is now in preparation.

EDITORIALS *continued from page 4*

Now, almost a year later, the staff has just begun re-interviewing the stations and holding a large community "access meeting" to prepare a new formal Collective Request. This new Request is expected to be much larger. Ms. Rankin feels that CCOM has increased community access to the broadcast media. The media have learned that their efforts are serious, and therefore probably give reader access to people on their list than to the average citizen. But in terms of the over-all time devoted by stations to airing the views of citizens, access has not increased.

The lesson is simple and direct, whether in Chicago or other cities. The broadcast media will respond to community demands if the effort is (1) massive enough, which stations may ignore only at their commercial peril, (2) specific enough to be enacted without soul-searching or expensive effort on the part of the station, and (3) backed by an enduring citizens' lobby which plans to stay in the public business year after year. ■ ■

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
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COMING INTO FOCUS

Chicago and **Rockford** in Illinois are among 22 cities which will participate in a national urban homesteading program. Title to abandoned houses will be turned over to the cities by HUD for a payment of \$1 per house and a promise to find people willing to repair and occupy these dwelling units. Cities can, in turn, charge more than the minimum \$1 if they make improvements before reselling the houses. Buyers must agree to live in the homestead dwellings for at least three years. The total value of the houses involved amounts to \$250,000 for each of the two Illinois cities.

WJBC, a Bloomington radio station, can now turn on specially equipped home radios to warn residents of life-threatening emergencies. However, in order to take advantage of the service, listeners must first purchase a specially made AM-FM radio costing about \$54. Then, in the event of an emergency, a series of tones broadcast by the station's special equipment will activate the radio, an announcer will describe the situation, and another series of tones will deactivate the system. WJBC,

together with its FM counterpart, WBNO, is the first station in Illinois and one of the first in the nation to install such a system.

Sunshine Drapery Company, as their participation in the Bicentennial Celebration, will provide at absolutely no charge drapery material to any restoration program on buildings of economic, political, historic, or social significance in the development of the United States. They will also donate time from their Design Staff to help coordinate the colors, textures, and theme of designs for the period. The only criteria is that the organization handling the project be non-profit and have proof that they are going to complete the project; also it would have to be located within a one-hundred-mile radius of their office, located at 1450 Ashby Rd., St. Louis, Mo. 63132. For additional information call Jim Williams at (314) 429-7600.

We must commend U.S. Rep. **James W. Symington's** stand to provide free drugs and counseling to drug addicts. He is advocating "a very limited test" of the British system of treating drug addiction gently in order to reduce addicts' incentive to commit crimes to obtain money for the illegal purchase of narcotics. He favors strong penalties for the illegal sale of hard drugs. In Missouri's contentious primary for the Democratic Senate nomination, this proposal was immediately attacked by U.S. Rep. **Jerry Litton** and former Gov. **Warren E. Hearnes**, all of them Symington's opponents for the Democratic nomination. Of course state Attorney General **John C. Danforth**, probable GOP Senate nominee, joined the chorus of opposition.

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
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THE RIGHT WING

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The January issue of *American Opinion*, the monthly journal of the John Birch Society, features an unusual interview by

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Alan Stang, one of their most prolific writers, with numerous columnists on the conservative side. Among those who helped the magazine by being interviewed was Phyllis Schlafly.

The January *Bulletin* of the Birch Society includes a letter from a member in Rhode Island boasting that she organized the successful opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment in that state. Among other things she says that her group brought in Phyllis Schlafly as the star witness.

NAM MOVES TO RIGHT

The National Association of Manufacturers, once a bastion of real reaction but more recently more moderate in representing big business, has made several changes which move it again to the right.

One is the selection of Forrest I. Rettgers to be Senior Vice President for Operations. Rettgers was the first Chairman of the Heritage Foundation, created two years ago with the major help of Joseph Coors, the right-wing brewer who was denied confirmation by the Senate last year as a member of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and who has supported the John Birch Society.

Rettgers had previously worked for Senator Harry Byrd, the conservative from Virginia, and had run a Washington liaison office for Coors called Midwestern Industries. Coors is a director of NAM.

Another Heritage Foundation leader, J. Robert Fluor, has been chairman of the NAM's Public Affairs Leadership Council.

The NAM recently announced that it has "worked out a program of mutual support and cooperation" with the U.S. Industrial Council, formerly the Southern States Industrial Council. This group was organized to fight New Deal legislation and has continued to oppose Federal government activity. It supplied a significant number of John Birch Society leaders, and in recent years has been run by Anthony Harrigan, a prolific writer and speaker who has appeared on numerous right-wing letterheads.

REAGAN'S CANDIDACY BOLSTERS RIGHT WING

Some of the right-wing groups Ronald Reagan has helped by speeches, signature on fund-raising letters, appearances in films, and in other ways are the following:

Christian Anti-Communism Crusade of
Dr. Fred Schwarz
Christian Crusade of Dr. Billy
James Hargis
Church League of America
Young Americans for Freedom
National Review of William F. Buckley, Jr.
Project Prayer
Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation
Human Events, the conservative tabloid
Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge
Life Line

Christian Freedom Foundation
America's Future
National Association of
Professional Educators
Charles Edison Memorial Youth Fund
Citizens for Constructive Action
National Indignation Convention

SMITH SUED BY REPORTER

Edd Jeffords, a former reporter for the Carroll County Tribune (Ark.), filed a \$150,000 suit in federal court last year charging that Gerald L. K. Smith and Charles Robertson conspired to have him fired from the Tribune, reports the Gazette Northwest Arkansas Bureau.

Also named as a defendant is the Elma Smith Foundation, established by Smith in his wife's name. The Foundation is in charge of several tourist attractions at Eureka Springs, including the Christ of the Ozarks statue and the Passion Play produced by Smith. Robertson is director of the Foundation.

Jeffords alleges that after he was hired by the Tribune, he wrote a number of articles calling to the public's attention such local problems at Eureka Springs as pollution of the town's springs by overflow from the city sewer system and disputes over a proposed sign control ordinance.

Jeffords alleges that Smith demanded that he be fired as a reporter. When the publisher refused, Jeffords said, Smith canceled the Foundation's advertising account with the Tribune.

Jeffords said the publisher then contacted Robertson, who confirmed that the cancellation would remain in effect until Jeffords was fired. The publisher advised Jeffords the next day that the cancellation would have a serious effect on the financial position of the Tribune and Jeffords was dismissed, the suit alleges.

Jeffords said that at the time of his firing, he also had begun publishing a monthly newspaper, the *Ozark Digest*, which the Tribune agreed to print, taking printing costs from his salary. He alleged that a conspiracy between Smith and Robertson not only caused the loss of his job from the Tribune, but also, by ending his salary, resulted in the cessation of the *Digest*.

Jeffords said the Foundation was active in prompting various political, social and economic doctrines, some of which involved discrimination against various classes of persons, including Jews, foreigners and persons with liberal political philosophies and long hair. The defendants, Jeffords said, regard him as a member of a certain class, namely, "long-haired radicals."

Smith is the editor of "The Cross and the Flag," the monthly publication of his Christian Nationalist Crusade, a right-wing group.

He has long been openly associated with anti-Jewish sentiment.